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The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is simultaneously the largest and the fastest growing
distributed system known to date. With the expectation of 50 billion of devices coming
online by 2020, far surpassing the size of the human population, problems related to
scale, trustability and security are anticipated. Current IoT architectures are inherently
flawed as they are centralized on the cloud and explore fragile trust-based relationships
over a plethora of loosely integrated devices, leading to IoT platforms being non-robust
for every party involved and unable to scale properly in the near future. The need for a
new architecture that addresses these concerns is urgent as the IoT is progressively more
ubiquitous, pervasive and demanding regarding the integration of devices and processing
of data increasingly susceptible to reliability and security issues.
In this thesis, we propose a decentralized ledgering solution for the IoT, leveraging
a recent concept: blockchains. Rather than replacing the cloud, our solution presents a
scalable and fault-tolerant middleware for recording transactions between peers, under
verifiable and decentralized trustability assumptions and authentication guarantees for
IoT devices, cloud services and users. Following on the emergent trend in modern IoT ar-
chitectures, we leverage smart hubs as blockchain gateways, aggregating, pre-processing
and forwarding small amounts of data and transactions in proximity conditions, that
will be verified and processed as transactions in the blockchain. The proposed middle-
ware acts as a secure ledger and establishes private channels between peers, requiring
transactions in the blockchain to be signed using threshold signature schemes and group-
oriented verification properties. The approach improves the decentralization and ro-
bustness characteristics under Byzantine fault-tolerance settings, while preserving the
blockchain distributed nature.
Keywords: Blockchains, Internet-of-Things (IoT), Decentralized Ledgering, Decentral-




A Internet-das-Coisas (IoT) é o sistema distribuído maior e de mais rápido cresci-
mento conhecido à data de hoje. Espera-se que 50 mil milhões de dispositivos se ativem
e interliguem até 2020, o que ultrapassará largamente o tamanho da população humana
e colocará problemas complexos de escala, confiabilidade e segurança. Verifica-se que
as atuais arquiteturas de IoT têm limitações inerentes, devido à centralização na cloud
e à integração pouco regulada de uma panóplia de dispositivos com base em relações
de confiança frágeis para os participantes envolvidos, resultando na incapacidade das
plataformas de IoT de escalar eficientemente no futuro próximo. A necessidade de novas
arquiteturas que abordem estas questões é urgente, à medida que a IoT se torna cada vez
mais ubíqua, disseminada e passe a exigir a integração de dispositivos e processamento
de informação cada vez mais sensíveis do ponto de vista da fiabilidade e segurança.
Nesta tese, propomos uma solução de registo de transações descentralizado para a
IoT, beneficiando de um conceito recente: blockchains. Em vez de substituir a cloud, a
nossa solução apresenta-se como um middleware escalável e tolerante a falhas, capaz de
registar transações entre participantes com garantias de autenticação entre dispositivos
de IoT, serviços de cloud e os próprios utilizadores, de forma mutuamente auditável e
sem dependência de bases de confiança externas. Seguindo ainda a orientação recente
nas novas arquiteturas para a IoT, a nossa abordagem utiliza smart hubs como portais de
comunicação com a blockchain que permitem a agregação de tráfego e o processamento
de pequenos conjuntos de dados em condições de proximidade, que serão verificados e
processados como transações na blockchain. O middleware perspectivado age como um
registo de transações seguro e confiável e estabelece canais privados entre participan-
tes, providenciando assinaturas de transações com base em esquemas de assinatura de
limiar, com verificação e auditabilidade orientada a grupos de participantes, para um
aumento de descentralização e robustez em conjugação com requisitos de tolerância a
falhas bizantinas, preservando a natureza distribuída da tecnologia blockchain.
Palavras-chave: Blockchains, Internet-das-Coisas (IoT), Registo de Transações Descen-
tralizado, Esquemas Criptográficos de Assinaturas de Limiar, Middleware de Registo de
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1.1 Context and Motivation
Blockchain technology first emerged in 2008 as a proposition for a cryptocurrency widely
known as Bitcoin, allowing for secure peer-to-peer transactions without relying on third-
party entities, such as financial institutions and banks [54]. Considered by many as a
disruptive force on both the industry and the academia, and viewed by others as some-
what hyped and yet to mature, blockchains are a novel concept that’s growing beyond
digital currencies, steadily becoming a foundational technology adopted in other areas
due to its immense potential for transforming the traditional industry by providing de-
centralization, security, persistency and auditability properties [45, 62, 79].
One of the areas where blockchain’s properties seem most beneficial in its potential
is the approach of a new generation of architectures for the Internet-of-Things (IoT). The
IoT is a new paradigm shift that promises to seriously impact our everyday lives with
the presence of intelligent and ubiquitous systems that will interact between themselves
and directly with us humans, whether or not we are aware of it. Expected to grow at
an extraordinary pace, reaching around 50 billion devices by 2020 [39], the IoT already
needs an urgent reboot [55], mainly because of high infrastructure costs due to the usage
of centralized platforms, proprietary server farms and cloud services, the reliance on
trust-based models, and the overall lack of privacy and security concerns. As the IoT
market keeps growing, the explosion of data to be transmitted to the cloud in current cen-
tralized models will lead to cloud providers struggling with their capacity and resources.
The impetus for this reboot is further strengthened by today’s IoT platforms offering no
possibility for scrutiny or control by end users in terms of privacy, security or trustability
conditions. No two devices can interact directly without communication passing through
service providers, while commercially available IoT platforms and services maintain their
1
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own data silos for personalized service and profiling, without users being able to control
how their data is used and logged and with the possibility of that same data being sold to
third-parties or mishandled by providers.
In fact, it seems that the blockchain, an invention once fueled by the need of replac-
ing the increasingly prevalent trust-based model in electronic payment systems with a
more secure and robust model tolerant to fraud attempts and to third-party manipula-
tion could extend its use-case into the IoT and solve some of its growing entropy. For
such synergy to occur, however, some challenging obstacles that arise from both worlds
need to be studied and tackled first. Blockchains currently suffer from two considerable
problems: scalability and privacy, with repercussions of such concerns in achieving the
best balance in performance (transaction throughput and latency conditions), as well as
in membership management of the participants involved and in the reliability guarantees
under Byzantine-fault tolerance assumptions. Scalability has been a continuous source
of debate on how to improve transaction processing throughput and latency without
compromising system security and decentralization [20, 74]. Privacy has seen ongoing
efforts on how to deal with data privacy and traceability concerns, since transactions are
globally published across peers [5, 78]. On the other hand, the IoT is also facing major
challenges [60], such as the heterogeneity of devices properties and the proliferation of
proprietary solutions as specific IoT ecosystems, the lack of standards for interoperability
and for communicating parties, regulated protocols and technologies, and the diversity
of support for different cryptographic primitives and algorithms.
Recent edge computing models have also emerged to mitigate the privacy issues in
the growing market of the IoT by providing local processing and storage capabilities to
the edge, leveraging smart hubs that aggregate, filter, process and control data-flows, in-
termediate different protocols by protocol translation, and orchestrate sets of IoT devices
in local-controlled environments, avoiding the need of direct communication with cloud-
provider services and applications [10]. These hubs allow for better privacy controls by
selective filtering and obfuscating user data while aggregating and pre-processing data
on the edge, also avoiding huge amounts of sensitive data to be sent up to the cloud. A
vision of merging these new architectural models for the IoT with blockchain-enabled
data repositories and logging, regarded as blockchained IoT platforms, seems to be an
interesting direction to solve some of the scalability, security, privacy and trustability
issues of current IoT platforms and applications.
1.2 Objective and Expected Contributions
Problem Statement. Current security models for the IoT are centralized by nature or
cloud-based intermediated under no control by end users, relying on a central authority
for each specific service provider to orchestrate device communication, data storage and
logging of operations between several nodes. While this approach is acceptable assuming
an honest central authority and a modest number of devices, a preferable solution would
2
1.2. OBJECTIVE AND EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS
be one that does not rely on centralized models of trust in service providers or in third-
party interventions of entities assumed as trusted services. The decentralization of such
functions under independent auditing guarantees is crucial, given the exponential growth
of the number of IoT devices and the need for a model that is able to scale accordingly
and provide reliability without a single point-of-failure or being too costly to maintain.
Therefore, the question that the dissertation addressed is e following:
How can we address the foundations, services and mechanisms, to design new and more re-
liable IoT platform architectures, as to improve trustability, scrutiny and scalability guarantees,
taking advantage of blockchain-enabled logging and decentralized ledgering properties?
Objective. Our hypothesis for the research question in the problem statement is that it
is possible to improve the trustability properties of IoT platforms by introducing mech-
anisms to perform information flow control via local smart hubs, providing gateway
facilities supported by blockchain-enabled decentralized data management conditions.
We believe that the approach can address better conditions to scale and to control the
trustability assumptions of the IoT operation. For this purpose, we must research on how
to efficiently reshape the common centralized security model of the current cloud-enabled
IoT platforms, into a decentralized approach, reducing the need for centralized trust au-
thorities, and simultaneously considering the possible integration of the diversity of IoT
devices, that can range from objects as mundane as toasters and doorknobs to highly
complex technology as rentable cars and industrial equipment, each with their own differ-
ent computational capabilities and resource limitations. Figure 1.1 reflects a high-level
illustration of our intent and on how we wish to harness these concepts to transition
































Edge devices and users
Figure 1.1: High-level system model proposal
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To support our thesis statement, we must introduce improved mechanisms in the
blockchain for a better management of decentralized trust in scalability conditions. We
can see this approach as a clean slate approach for a new generation of open IoT platforms,
in which the users have full control over their devices, autonomy to audit trustability con-
ditions and a better control of the sensor data collected in the edge of the IoT. In this
approach, we will add to the notion of the smart hub edge-based architectures and pro-
vide middleware services with the ability for decentralized ledgering and group-oriented
verifiable signatures and verifiable transaction logging, allowing for a global autonomous
validation of transactions involving data sharing between devices, in a fully decentralized
data management model enabled by a base blockchain platform.
Research Contributions. In concordance with the objective defined above, we emphasize
the following contributions as a set of relevant outcomes from the thesis elaboration:
• An analysis on effectiveness, properties and support provided by different blockchain
platforms, surveying their provided services and mechanisms, in order to be ad-
dressed as candidates for leveraging extensibility requirements in enhancing decen-
tralized ledgering and reliability foundations for blockchain-enabled IoT platforms;
• In the previous contribution we include a detailed analysis of different blockchain
platforms, studying each platform in terms of different characteristics, including:
system architecture, software engineering approaches, reliability and scalability
conditions, as well as, programming support, which in turn, includes the analysis
of support for smart-contracts regulating supported transactions, regarding expres-
siveness conditions, openness and extensibility possibilities;
• A system model capable of acting as a decentralized ledger for the IoT that is able to
deviate the blockchain scalability concerns away from the IoT and provide a robust
cryptographically-verifiable middleware layer and an autonomous verification of
trustability conditions that protects every party involved;
• An innovative transaction and smart contract verification protocol that resorts to
threshold signatures to further decentralize blockchain architecture, capable of
outperforming multi-signature schemes under Byzantine fault-tolerance guarantees
and requiring smaller ledger block sizes;
• A powerful extension for smart contract specification that allows contracts not only
to specify the properties of an application running on a blockchain system but also
the properties of the system itself and on how transaction flows should occur;
• A fully functional prototype implementation based on our system model and its
respective experimental assessment, where smart hubs can be leveraged to pro-
vide scalable gateways to blockchain-enabled IoT platforms with increasing stress





Following this first chapter, the remainder of this document is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 focuses on a series of relevant related works in a top-down fashion, start-
ing from an understanding of current IoT cloud-based platforms and the inherent
centralization problems related to these architectures, to how blockchains work
and an analysis of existing blockchain platforms, all the way down to threshold
cryptography and its applicability to the blockchain transaction verification flows;
• Chapter 3 describes our system model and architecture for a decentralized and
scalable ledgering platform for the IoT, inspired by the related work;
• Chapter 4 outlines our prototype implementation effort for a system inspired by
the system model in the previous chapter;
• Chapter 5 presents the results of our experimental assessment over the imple-
mented prototype and our critical analysis of each benchmark;
• Chapter 6 wraps up this document with a set of concluding remarks on the con-












In this chapter we address the existent related work of our thesis. We first present a back-
ground of the study to familiarize the reader with each topic we describe ahead. We start
the related work by addressing the Internet-of-Things (IoT), cloud-first IoT architectures
and their handicaps. We then introduce blockchains and their properties, proceeding
to evaluate the state-of-the art of blockchain platforms. Finally, we present threshold
cryptography and theorize on the possibility of leveraging threshold signature schemes
for blockchain transactions to increase decentralized trustability properties of typical
blockchain architectures. We finish the chapter with a critical analysis of these subjects.
2.1 Background
The inability of current cloud-first IoT architectures to provide independent auditability
properties to every party involved with decentralized trustability assumptions is increas-
ingly critical with each new IoT device present in our lives. Current systems, which are
heavily dependent upon centralized cloud infrastructures, lack in robustness and privacy
concerns, and are significantly susceptible to faults and fraudulent behaviour from ser-
vice providers. Concerns that cloud providers will not scale in the foreseeable future
as the IoT grows at an astounding rhythm and that the fierce competition between IoT
platform manufacturers will drive to the increase of closed IoT environments and vendor
lock-in practices are also paramount. Thus, an alternative architecture that specifically
addresses the issues of robustness, centralization and scalability is needed.
The fact that this new architecture may be given by a technology that we popularly
acknowledge as being the backbone of cryptocurrencies as Bitcoin and Ethereum may be
unexpected at first. However, blockchains have clear practical beneficial properties that
can be applied to various scenarios, as they provide a truly decentralized approach to
7
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modern distributed systems and data-repository services, that has yet to be replicated by
other systems. Foremost, they allow for cryptographically secure and verifiable ledgering.
As such, various platforms that harness blockchain technology have emerged over the
years [5, 12, 28, 33, 40, 56], enabling for innovative decentralized applications that are
better prepared to answer the scalability and dependability requirements imposed by
modern systems.
For the sake of simplicity, a blockchain can be viewed as a public ledger in which
multiple peers register and verify transactions between themselves. These transactions
are recorded in the form of blocks, which are then chained together forming the ac-
tual blockchain, acting as a permanent database for the transaction records [54]. The
blockchain is not bound to a central authority and is instead distributed across the multi-
ple peers that compose the network, hence the property of decentralization. To add new
blocks to the chain, nodes have to mine the most recent block, which requires solving
a computational puzzle based on cryptographic hash functions, and present a proof-of-
work [54] to other peers so that they can continue on producing the next block.
We will approach some of the state-of-the-art of existent blockchain platforms in
bigger detail in the following sections and study different points-of-view on how to im-
plement the blockchain model and relevant extensions. Perhaps the most powerful evo-
lution to date to be implemented on the blockchain is the concept of smart contracts [70]
– special scripts that reside on the blockchain providing it the ability of enforcing and
cryptographically verifying distributed workflows – which is a source of immense interest
for the IoT domain since it enables the automation of complex multi-step processes [16].
Before the blockchain is successfully merged into the IoT ecosystem, a larger compre-
hension of what cryptographic primitives and multiparty computing protocols to use is
needed in comparison with traditional environments that are not as diverse and resource-
limited in nature. Promising advances have already been made, with lightweight encryp-
tion standards and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) being pushed forward as a possible
future for resource-constrained devices [60], as well as the rise of new architectures that
are able to reduce some of the overhead of the blockchain protocol by outsourcing the
protocol to a back-end network more capable of handling its overhead [24].
2.2 The Internet-of-Things (IoT)
The Internet-of-Things (IoT for short) can be defined as the collection of everyday de-
vices and objects that are embedded with electronics allowing them to compute and
communicate via some type of network. This definition covers a lot of physical objects we
know today that are already interconnecting with each other through virtual components
practically everywhere by leveraging micro-controllers, network adapters, sensors and
actuators. Such devices are progressively more aware of their surroundings and more
capable of capturing, producing and reacting to information for various purposes (e.g.
motion detection, speech recognition, surveillance and intrusion detection) [60]. This
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ubiquity has lead the IoT far away from being a concept, and it has been growing and
evolving at a stunning speed, expecting to hit the 50 billion device mark by 2020 accord-
ing to current estimates [39]. Its sheer potential opens up innovative and increasingly
complex concepts such as smart homes, domotic-oriented office automation, smart energy
grids, and smart cities by establishing networks where several specialized devices can
collaborate to provide a number of pervasive services [4, 24].
2.2.1 IoT Platforms and Architectures
Today’s most well known use-case of IoT systems are at the smart home setting. The need
and usefulness for automating and remotely controlling several devices in the common
household by connecting them over the Internet inspired the idea of integrating micro-
controllers into almost everything. However, as manufacturers produced more and more
smart devices over time, using cost-effective hardware components for specialized func-
tions, the IoT got increasingly heterogeneous, composed by multiple devices with very
distinct capabilities, most of which considerably resource-constrained.
To address this, current IoT platforms generally apply a cloud-first architecture, mean-
ing they offload resource-intensive tasks to cloud services, since it is infeasible to perform
complex application logic on the severely constrained hardware of most devices. As such,
IoT platforms usually come in the form of proprietary cloud gateways which the user can
control via some sort of desktop or smartphone application. The cloud services, in turn,
orchestrate the IoT devices connected to it according to the user’s commands and to de-
ployed internal application logic. Data generically flows back and forth between the cloud
and the edge, with the latter collecting environment information and actuating upon it
and upon the cloud service’s commands. In most cases, users have no direct control of
what information is sent/received to/from the cloud besides what the service provider
intends to give them control of. Still, the motivation behind cloud-based approaches
is clear: they allow for an unique centralized point of management, orchestration and
monitoring of IoT environments, which have the potential for reaching overwhelming
sizes of thousands, millions and perhaps even billions of devices that are impossible to
address simultaneously otherwise. At the same time, they deviate resource-intensive
tasks from the IoT. And even though newer IoT devices may be less constrained in the
future, older devices or extremely specialized types of devices (e.g. door locks, light bulbs,
thermometers) that already compose a big part of the IoT are unlikely to be updated [17].
In recent years, smart home architectures started introducing a new intermediary
device at the edge level, called a smart hub, in an attempt to unify the plethora of different
devices, independently of manufacturer or proprietary software, under a single unified
control interface and a standardized set of communication protocols (e.g. Apple HomeKit,
Amazon Echo, Samsung SmartThings [2, 3, 61]). These architectures closely resemble
the depiction on Figure 2.1. These centralized hubs have the benefits of performing data
aggregation, storage and processing on the edge and communicate with cloud services
9







Figure 2.1: Depiction of cloud-based IoT architectures
on behalf of the smart devices only when needed, improving overall user experience and
minimizing latency for tasks that do not necessarily need the raw power of the cloud.
2.2.2 IoT Centralization Concerns: Privacy, Scalability and Robustness
Cloud-based platforms have the ability of rearranging the entropy of IoT networks into
simple vertical topologies with a centralized point of control, data storage and processing.
While practical benefits are evident, these vertical architectures raise some concerns with
potentially negative and harmful consequences, particularly regarding to the privacy of
user’s personal data, the scalability of modern cloud systems and the robustness of IoT
architectures. These three problems all originate from the centralization of the whole sys-
tem to a single point-of-failure and trust: the cloud. Our thesis is particularly concerned
in finding solutions for the latter two issues.
Privacy. As mentioned before, users have little control over what information do their
devices send to the cloud. During the normal lifecycle of edge devices, cloud systems
are used to store and process all needed data for posterior use by the whole system.
Simultaneously, cloud providers collect information for analytic and statistical purposes
in order to provide a better quality of service. This continuous process of collecting
data in the cloud requires the user to trust the service that his personal and sensitive
information is kept confidential and secured, and that the service is not going to attempt
to use it in a fraudulent manner. This is a specially strong assumption, as seen from
recent real cases of theft and unauthorized disclosure of personal information [26, 31, 38,
52], proving that this trust relationship has been broken a worrisome number of times,
with data being used for illegitimate purposes.
Scalability. As the number of connected IoT devices grows at an exponential rate,
so does the amount of data they generate, directly increasing the workloads that cloud
services (and consequentially data centers) need to handle. Current predictions estimate
that these workloads will increase massively, as far as 750% up until 2019 [76]. Given
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that current IoT architectures rely on the cloud extensively these estimates serve as a
dire warning that the consumption of resources by the IoT will far exceed the capability
of the cloud to provide them. Current systems will not be able to scale to the needs
of the IoT, and a redesign of existing architectures is therefore urgently needed. Some
authors have proposed to address the scalability problem at the edge with the integration
of edge computing models such as the one in [10] as part of the architecture of IoT
platforms. These models rely on the deployment of edge nodes with reasonable hardware
and capable of storing and processing moderate amounts of data close to the resource-
constrained IoT devices to perform local data aggregation, storage and computing tasks,
minimizing the volume of data and traffic sent to the cloud, resorting to it only when
further processing is needed. This model seems to be in line with the emergent smart
hub technology described previously and allows for a better privacy control, since data
can be processed locally and the hub may filter subsets of that same data to be sent to the
cloud for analytics or backup.
Robustness. Current IoT models do not offer satisfactory security measures for all of
the parties involved, depending too much on centralized entities that are susceptible to
fraudulent behaviour. A network where every device is subjugated to a central authority
is a network that is ultimately controlled by a single point-of-failure. More importantly,
there is no direct form for users and devices to verify and audit if certain workflows are
valid or authorized without depending on the central authority to do so [4, 16]. The
problem with centralization is even more evident in critical systems like financial and
banking operations, healthcare systems and military networks, in which people’s assets
and lives may be compromised by faulty systems [4]. A security-through-transparency
democratic decentralized and trustless ledgering solution, capable of securely distribut-
ing information in cryptographically verifiable workflows across IoT devices is therefore
needed, and can be leveraged through the use of emergent blockchain technology ac-
cording to several authors [4, 16, 55, 64]. For instance, in [24] the authors propose a
decentralized overlay network using blockchains that uses the cloud merely for storing
data, although it assumes the cloud as part of its trust computing base. In this model,
smart hubs connect to representative nodes in the overlay network which is responsible
for providing robustness and auditability while deviating the blockchain protocol from
edge devices. In [64], despite the absence of smart hubs in their architecture, the authors
propose the use of a blockchain layer to mediate access control and disrupt the need of
trust in cloud systems in a similar way to [24].
2.3 Blockchains
In this section we present blockchain technology and relevant concepts. For the context of
this thesis our focus is on blockchain technology itself and not on Bitcoin or any other type
of cryptocurrency, even though we might resort to such systems for illustrative purposes.
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2.3.1 Relevant Concepts in Blockchain Technology
A fundamental problem of distributed systems is consensus, which requires different
processes, or participants in the same network, to decide and agree on a given data
value in order for the system to maintain overall consistency. The consensus problem
has been around since the birth of distributed systems and has been formally described
in the literature [18]. Consensus mechanisms have to be properly designed if they are
to be used in real world applications. An ordinary aspect of any system is that it can
fail, either by crashes, message omissions or Byzantine behaviour [50] (faults caused by
software/hardware errors or malicious attacks on nodes). Consensus algorithms have to
take this fact into account and provide a way to maintain consistency in the presence
of a given number of faults. However, in asynchronous networks, this concept collides
with a problem known as the FLP impossibility [27], which states that it is impossible
to deterministically establish consensus in an asynchronous system where at least one
process is able to fail. Nevertheless, various algorithms, such as Paxos and Google’s
Chubby, are used today in asynchronous settings and a small probability of not reaching
consensus is tolerated.
The blockchain, as the name suggests, is a chain, or a list of records, comprised of a
continuously growing number of data blocks, linked together in a way that allows partic-
ipating nodes in a peer-to-peer network to establish a sequential history of transactions1
and agree on the order that they occurred on the system. To achieve this, blockchains
resort to their own consensus mechanism based on cryptographic proof. Blockchains can
be thought of as decentralized databases, providing persistency of data, a high level of
fault-tolerance, and security, all without the need of trust in a third-party. Decentraliza-
tion is a key property, since there is no single point of failure in the system, making truly
decentralized blockchains resilient to even Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
2.3.2 Blockchain Operation
Nodes that wish to start a new transaction in the blockchain broadcast it over the net-
work, letting other nodes collect this transaction into a data block – the main unit of the
blockchain which is able to hold several different transactions [54]. Every data block in
the blockchain contains an hash of the previous block, a nounce and relevant transaction







Figure 2.2: Blockchain block structure (from [54])
1We use the term transaction since that’s the terminology used in the literature, but it should be consid-
ered in the sense of a generic exchange of information between processes rather than its economic denotation.
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The hash of the previous block is generated by applying a secure hash function to the
content of the block. At the start of the chain lies the genesis block, whose purpose is to
act as the beginning of the chain and authenticate the entire chain (backtracking on any
block should always yield the same genesis block). The nounce is an arbitrary number
whose value is determined in a way that ensures that the secure hash function output of
the block starts with a sequence of leading zeros. To compute the value of the nounce,
nodes go through a process known as mining, looping through different values for the
nounce and submitting them to the secure hash function until a result with leading zeros
is found, expending CPU power and resources. The number of leading zeros determines
the difficulty involved in finding the correct hash, with a lesser number of zeroes requiring
less computational effort than a bigger number, and is decided by the participants of the
network if blocks are being produced at a faster than normal rate. This cryptographic
puzzle solving process lies at the heart of blockchain’s consensus mechanism, since nodes
are required to present the block and the correct nounce as a proof-of-work to other
participants in the network to be granted the right to add the new block to the existing
chain. Upon receival of the proof-of-work, other nodes can quickly verify that it is in fact
the correct solution by submitting it to the same secure hash function, and checking if
the contained transactions are valid. If both verifications succeed, nodes accept the proof-
of-work and begin working on the next block, thus expanding the chain. When two or
more nodes solve the mining problem concurrently or a misbehaving node intentionally
duplicates blocks of transactions (an attack known as double-spending), a fork occurs,
splitting the blockchain into different branches. When this happens, miners can work on
any of the branches. Eventually, one of them will have more work invested into it and
grow in length, so nodes will redirect their effort to it since it will be the longest chain.
Due to the possibility of such race conditions, transactions are only confirmed after the
block they are contained hits a certain threshold of successors – the bigger number of
appended blocks, the slimmer is the probability of existing a concurrent branch.
Mining also gives the blockchain its inherent resistance to tampering and data modifi-
cation, since to change an existing block an attacker would have to regenerate all the other
blocks that come after it, recomputing the proof-of-work for each one. If the network is
dominated by an honest majority (≥ 51%), it is impossible that an attacker is able to forge
a fraudulent fork that surpasses the length of the honest chain even if spawning multiple
nodes, since honest nodes will always mine on the longest chain. Therefore, transactions
stored in the blockchain are considered to be irreversible, since attackers would need to
subvert the network to be able to forge a chain that reverts them.
The last component of the block is the actual data, which is stored in a Merkle tree
structure [53]. The purpose of this structure is that it serves as cryptographic proof of the
transactions stored in a block by hashing upward to the tree’s root: if transaction data (a
leaf node) is tampered with or any node in the tree is rearranged, the resulting root hash
value of the tree won’t match the original one, and can be detected as invalid. Pruning
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can be employed to save disk space without damaging the tree’s intended function. Trans-
actions themselves are stored in the form of coins, a term originating from cryptocurrency,
which are structured objects generally containing the address of the recipient, the data of
the transaction and the sender’s digital signature proving the authenticity of the coin.
2.3.3 Smart Contracts
While not part of the original architecture of the blockchain, the concept of smart con-
tracts [70] emerged as a way of enabling content-agnostic blockchain systems capable of
running arbitrary rules and policies. In essence, smart contracts are nothing more than
user-defined code that can be triggered by peers to allow the distributed execution of ar-
bitrary state transition functions between network nodes, enabling mutually distrustful
peers to interact with each other in a transparent and deterministic way, since everyone
has access to the same code [16].
For example, one can implement a smart contract that is able to support the lifecycle of
a passenger’s flight insurance. The passenger can register a transaction in the blockchain
representing the payment of the insurance and the smart contract code can process the
business logic that handles gathering information about that flight from external services.
Depending on that same information, if the flight is on time or delayed, the contract can
deterministically decide if the passenger will pay or get paid the insurance.
The first successful implementation of smart contracts was made by Ethereum [12],
with other systems following soon after, as we will see on the next section (Section 2.4).
In Ethereum, smart contracts execute in a sandboxed runtime environment called the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), which is replicated across every network node. The
contract code is persisted on the blockchain and deployed within a block, similarly to a
set of transactions, and can be triggered by sending transactions towards its address [16],
updating each node’s state through a State Machine Replication (SMR) process. Contracts
are regulated by special fees (gas units) that ensure code termination and play a big part
in transaction verification, since every node locally verifies contract code conformance
with gas limits.
2.3.4 Blockchain Design Issues
Blockchains are certainly fascinating in their own design and properties, but not without
its caveats, namely, low scalability and lack of privacy.
Low scalability. The blockchain’s low scalability manifests itself in limited through-
put and high confirmation latency of transactions, high bootstrap time for new nodes,
and significantly elevated costs regarding storage requirements, network bandwidth and
CPU usage [20]. This severely impacts the adoption rate of blockchain technology and its
application to other use cases beyond cryptocurrency. For a better understanding of the
problem, we will follow the vision of Croman et al. [20] and unfold the blockchain into
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different planes, each with notable inefficiencies: Network, Consensus, Storage and View.
Given the scope of this thesis, we won’t consider the Side plane defined by the authors.
The Network plane refers to the message exchange between peers during the several
phases of the protocol. The inefficiency related to this plane lies with the local validation
of transactions by each node, which delays transaction propagation, and with duplicate
transmission, since each transaction is propagated twice: first when a node proposes a
transaction for the first time and once again when a block is mined and relayed.
The Consensus plane concerns itself with improving the speed of the consensus algo-
rithm of the blockchain and reducing block latency. Network-wide proof-of-work con-
sensus, while completely decentralized, is a computationally costly and time-consuming
algorithm, standing as the major bottleneck to throughput [74]. There are several possible
approaches for this plane, from sharding peers into groups and reconciling consensus
by means of some Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) SMR protocol, such as PBFT [15], to
semi-decentralizing the blockchain in a hierarchical fashion with a top-level blockchain
coordinating several smaller instance blockchains (sidechains), resorting to consortium
consensus protocols, thereby delegating some level of trust in small sets of trustable enti-
ties running a PBFT-based consensus, or even proof-of-stake, a protocol in which nodes
vote with whatever digital tokens they own on the system (a stake), instead of CPU power.
The Storage plane describes on how the ledger and state data are persisted across nodes.
In its original specification, every node of the blockchain holds a full copy of the ledger.
While this allows for a truly decentralized way of verifying transactions and blocks, it
brings a heavy storage cost given the growth potential of the blockchain2. A possible
approach is to shard the ledger across nodes and use a distributed hash table, or a similar
structure, to identify which nodes hold which part of the ledger.
Lastly, the View plane addresses how peers view the current state of the system. Conse-
quently, this plane is also related with bootstrapping, the process by which newly joining
nodes get up-to-date on the system’s state. The bootstrapping protocol is a cumbersome
SMR process that requires new nodes to download all of the blockchain down to the
genesis block and process the entire transaction history before being able participate in
the system. Most systems approach this problem with the introduction of partial nodes
– nodes that do not possess the ledger and are able to broadcast and receive transactions
but cannot verify them for themselves, relying on other nodes they trust for that matter
[33, 54]. More efficient approaches can be applied by relaxing the trust model restrictions
of the blockchain and outsourcing views in a cryptographically-secure and authenticated
manner from a subset of nodes [20, 69].
Lack of privacy. The privacy problem surfaces as the trade-off with blockchain’s trans-
parency and auditability. At the price of permanently recording every transaction pub-
licly, sensitive information can be disclosed to unwanted parties, breaking confidentiality,
and public-keys can be traced to identify traffic patterns, breaking anonymity.
2Bitcoin’s blockchain size over time: https://blockchain.info/charts/blocks-size
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Addressing transaction confidentiality is usually done by encrypting information, iso-
lating it in private channels between authorized parties or a mix of both. The Hawk frame-
work [49], for example, allows for the development of private smart contracts through the
use of public-key cryptography and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (zk-SNARKs)
– cryptographic schemes in which a message can be proven valid without any further in-
formation other than the fact that it is valid being conveyed and without peer interaction.
Zerocash [5] does a similar approach, obfuscating transaction data that can only be ac-
cessed by the parties involved in a transaction by harnessing zk-SNARKs as well. Another
solution is to split blockchain traffic into different isolated chains so that information is
revealed only to authorized nodes within the context of a single chain [28].
Regarding peer anonymity, plausible approaches such as allowing nodes to transact
under different public-keys [33] or splitting blockchain traffic into different subnets can
frustrate attempts to associate a node with a single public-key. More elaborate proposals,
such as the ones by Xu et al. [78] and Heilman et al. [35], consist of systems in which
virtual intermediaries, available to participating nodes in a transaction, execute smart
contracts between them, concealing the true identity of the participants. Other notewor-
thy advances, such as Zerocash [5], resort again to zk-SNARKs to prove the validity of
transactions without the need of peers knowing the identity the node that proposed them.
2.4 Blockchain Platforms
In the previous chapter, we have mentioned a concept called a blockchain platform. A
blockchain platform is a system fundamentally based on blockchain technology that
eases the process of building decentralized applications by providing a foundational layer
to build upon. Despite the infancy of blockchain technology, an increasing number of
platforms is emerging quickly, with several examples of decentralized applications built
upon these platforms in healthcare, supply chains, uncensorable social media, automated
locks, and many others use-cases [1, 25, 46, 77].
In this section, we will iterate over a representative set of platforms that can be lever-
aged for our objective. Unintentionally, this set is composed only by open-source plat-
forms. In the end, we will be able to discuss on the benefits and drawbacks of each system
by pondering on the following sets of characteristics:
• Software Engineering: Relates to the software development and construction charac-
teristics of the system:
– Quality of the resources documenting each system component;
– Size and activeness of the community behind the system. For a consistent
evaluation of each community, we will resort to Github metrics: stars – which
we interpret as a form of user appreciation – and forks – which are the result
of users reusing the platform’s source-code to build new systems.
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• System Architecture: Describes the architecture of the system having into account
the scalability and privacy design issues of the blockchain described in Subsection
2.3.4:
– Whether the system is permissioned or permissionless. Permissioned block-
chains impose restrictions on the actions peers are allowed to execute (par-
ticipating in consensus, validating transactions and blocks, executing smart
contracts, etc.), while permissionless blockchains do not;
– Degree of decentralization of the system taking into account dependencies on
third-parties, external services or federated groups of nodes. Decentralization
defines to what extent may a dependency influence the system into behaving
erratically and present a single point of failure for the entire system;
– Support for orchestrating multiple blockchains under a single platform;
– Transaction privacy and peer anonymity guarantees, in order to avoid tracing
and disclosure of sensitive information and traffic patterns;
– Transaction flow, in comparison with the original blockchain specification;
– Support for Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT) and how many nodes are needed
to tolerate f faulty replicas;
– Consensus mechanism being employed by the system. Whether it is pluggable
(i.e. changeable between BFT/crash-only) and what’s the system’s throughput
scalability with respect to transactions per second (tps);
– How is state and ledger data replicated across network nodes: globally across
the network or partially across subsets of nodes;
– How do nodes update their system’s state view, with regards to the consistency
model being used as well as on the ordering of messages;
• Expressiveness and Programming Support: Relates to the programming model that the
system provides for the implementation of custom logic. We will also address smart
contract extensibility, since some platforms implement only a partial notion of
smart contracts and do not support extensible content-agnostic code to be executed
in the blockchain.
2.4.1 Ethereum
Ethereum [12] is the best known permissionless blockchain system after Bitcoin, with a
rather active and large community (around 10000 stars and 3000 forks on Github). It is
also an open-source platform with a very complete and descriptive documentation. Its
creation was largely motivated by the idea of improving upon Bitcoin’s original archi-
tecture by retrofitting the blockchain with a Turing-complete scripting mechanism that
would allow custom code execution, i.e. extensible smart contracts.
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At the time of writing, Ethereum implements proof-of-work consensus mechanism,
ensuring a BFT decentralized agreement between all network nodes assuming 51% of
them are honest. It is planned to transition to a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake
model in the near future. Albeit consensus is optimized to be memory-hard instead of
CPU-hard, Ethereum suffers from the same low throughput capacity as Bitcoin does,
reaching an average maximum of 15 tps. Likewise, as in Bitcoin, every node keeps an
entire copy of the ledger and updates its system state view by executing a causally ordered
and eventually consistent SMR process. The transaction flow of Ethereum is roughly the
same as Bitcoin. Additionally, since the platform is intended at a public setting, Ethereum
does not provide any transaction privacy or peer anonymity guarantees.
Being an open-source platform, Ethereum gave birth to multiple other platforms.
We will address two well-known examples in the blockchain community, both of them
open-source, that were forked from the Ethereum codebase: Quorum and Hydrachain.
2.4.2 Quorum
JPMorgan’s Quorum [56] was built on the premise of creating a enterprise-oriented block-
chain, with Ethereum chosen as the groundwork for such platform to grow upon. Accord-
ingly, Quorum inherits the EVM and smart contract extensibility from its precursor.
Essentially, Quorum is a permissioned blockchain divided into a public and a private
network. As with regular blockchain systems, participants process all public transactions
received from the public network. However, the transactions in the private network
rely on proxy agents similar to [78], and asymmetrical encryption of data to ensure that
only the parties involved in a private transaction can process it. Private smart contracts
are also made possible by segmenting contract storage across nodes. Quorum further
introduces a degree of anonymity into the system by leveraging zk-SNARKs [5] to shield
private smart contract information between peers.
Quorum’s consensus mechanism is consortium-based [20] and has two distinct im-
plementations: Istanbul BFT (able to tolerate f faults with a population of 3f + 1 nodes)
and Raft (does not support BFT in exchange for higher throughput). There are no official
performance metrics available, but throughput is presumably highly scalable in any of
the implementations (with an average maximum throughput of over 1000 tps on standard
conditions) if we extrapolate the results of other platforms that also execute consensus in
a consortium PBFT-like manner. Regarding view computation, this consensus approach
ensures a strongly consistent, totally ordered SMR across the network.
Overall, Quorum is a very privacy-focused platform. JPMorgan itself and contributors
from the open-source community seem to be actively supporting the platform (which has
around 1500 stars and 300 forks on Github). The documentation provided is very rich
and thorough on most aspects of its architecture. However, Quorum is heavily dependent
on JPMorgan’s Constellation network and on a federated group of nodes for consensus,




Hydrachain [40], an open-source community-driven fork, introduces permissioned ledger-
ing into Ethereum, similarly to JPMorgan’s Quorum. Hydrachain’s consensus mechanism
is inspired by a consensus engine known as Tendermint [71] and is a BFT SMR algorithm,
executed in a consortium-like fashion, tolerant up to the order of 3f + 1 with f faulty
processes. As with Quorum, there are no proper performance metrics available, but since
consensus is executed in a small subset of nodes and presumably approximates Tender-
mint’s algorithm, its throughput scalability is presumably high as well, with over 1000
tps. View computation is a strongly consistent, totally ordered SMR process.
Perhaps one important feature of Hydrachain is its ability to bypass the EVM, allow-
ing the development of native smart contracts (written in Python) with faster execution
times. However, this allows for undeterministic code to be written by naive developers,
deadlocking the entire network. The platform was also designed with the architectural
idea of supporting multiple chains running in parallel, in which each node could par-
ticipate concurrently in two or more chains at once, allowing both context and privacy
concerns to be isolated. However, this feature never got past being future work and Hy-
drachain’s small community (with around 250 stars and 100 forks on Github) seems to
have gone cold, with no new features added into the platform’s source-code over a year
and with a very poor documentation which provides little insight into its architecture.
Other than the described features, Hydrachain is currently very similar to Ethereum
and even maintains an EVM for compatibility purposes with its predecessor.
2.4.4 The Hyperledger Project
The Hyperledger project consists of a plethora of different open-source blockchain plat-
forms and tools created by several contributors, aiming to provide standard cross-industry
collaborative tools for building rich decentralized applications [28]. For the purpose of
this thesis, we will be focusing on its main platforms: Fabric, Sawtooth, Burrow and
Iroha.
Fabric (also known as HLF) [42] was the kickstarter for Hyperledger, being developed
by IBM. We will only address the V1 version of the platform, since it is the most recent
one. Its community is rather large, with around 2500 stars and 2000 forks on Github, and
contributors seem to be actively engaged into improving the platform. Its documentation
is also very detailed and goes into depth of almost every aspect of its architecture.
Fabric supports the notion of multiple permissioned and interoperable chains, split-
ting sets of nodes across channels, in which nodes can participate concurrently. This
allows partitioning smart contracts and transactions accordingly, isolating data confiden-
tiality concerns. Ledger replication is partial, since each ledger is maintained and shared
only between authorized nodes on a per-channel basis. At the present moment, Fabric
does not leverage any anonymity mechanisms. Regarding consensus, Fabric resorts to an
external off-chain ordering service that establishes total order on the transactions of all
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its chains. This service is pluggable, but its official implementation is crash fault-tolerant
only. While this approach allows a unified consensus between chains and effectively en-
hances throughput, yielding over 1000 tps, it centralizes consensus by delegating trust to
the ordering service. It can be made BFT using the work by Sousa et al. [6].
The transaction flow within Fabric differs radically from the original blockchain spec-
ification, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. In Fabric, within the context of a channel, clients
propose transactions to a subset of nodes called endorsers. In turn, these nodes are re-
sponsible for verifying the validity of transactions and the sender’s signature, signing
(endorsing) the transaction and returning it to the client, which is responsible for sending
the now endorsed transaction to the consensus service. After consensus is reached, the
transaction is then propagated within a block to the channel where the nodes are partic-
ipating, and their ledgers and view of system’s state updated, in a strongly consistent,
totally ordered SMR process.
user request
submitting 
   client
Figure 2.3: Hyperledger Fabric transaction flow (adapted from [69])
One last important thing to note about Fabric is Chaincode, its implementation of
smart contracts. Chaincode follows closely the architecture of the EVM, providing a
sandboxed runtime environment for each node which interprets contracts written in Go,
but does not have a built-in gas limit that limits execution of contract code. Despite
the implementation being different, Chaincode allows for generic and extensible smart
contracts, identically to the EVM.
Sawtooth [44] was developed by Intel, with a strong focus on increasing the blockchain’s
consensus efficiency and minimizing resource consumption. Its community is small yet
active (around 500 stars and 250 forks on Github), and it has a rich documentation
describing its architecture. To implement a permissioned system, Sawtooth borrows a
modified EVM from Burrow, which we will describe ahead. Its consensus mechanism is
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pluggable, allowing for a crash fault-tolerant random leader election protocol, but it de-
faults to a novel approach dubbed proof-of-elapsed-time, which relies on nodes requesting
wait times from Intel’s SGX CPU enclaves – trusted execution environments that allow
code to be run in tamper-resistant private areas of the CPU – to elect a leader. The node
with the shortest wait time gets to add its block to the blockchain without expending
CPU cycles mining. Its support for BFT is the same as proof-of-work, requiring a majority
of honest nodes (51%) in order to tolerate faulty nodes, and its throughput scalability is
presumably high (over 1000 tps).
Regarding transaction flow, ledger replication and view computation, Sawtooth be-
haves identically to Ethereum or Bitcoin. Similarly, it does not address privacy and
anonymity as of yet. The degree of decentralization of the system merely depends on its
nodes possessing Intel SGX technology, since every other protocol action is decentralized.
Burrow [41] was previously known in the community as Eris:db, a blockchain plat-
form forked from Ethereum. As with Sawtooth, its community is small but growing
(currently around 200 stars and 100 forks on Github) and actively contributing to the
platform’s development. Its documentation is mediocre: it gives an overall understanding
of the features of the system but lacks in detailing them. Being an Ethereum fork, Burrow
makes use of a modified EVM featuring an access control layer implemented directly on
top of it as to provide a permissioned runtime environment for extensible smart contracts.
Burrow’s consensus mechanism is consortium-based and implemented by the Tender-
mint engine [71], allowing for a highly scalable throughput (reaching over of 1000 tps)
and BFT with 3f + 1 nodes in the presence of f faults. Nodes update their view of the
system through SMR, ensuring strong consistency and total order. Like Fabric, Burrow’s
architecture also allows for multiple chains, but at the moment consensus is established
at chain level and interoperability is limited, with plans of supporting this functionality
in the near future. This architecture somewhat allows for a weak transaction privacy
guarantee in the sense that data is confined within each chain. However, unlike Fabric,
where nodes can participate in multiple channels and establish private ledgers with other
peers, here nodes cannot participate concurrently in several chains. Anonymity is also
not addressed by this platform.
Iroha [43] is a permissioned blockchain that emphasizes on mobile device support
with simplicity in mind, providing a bare-bones platform to build upon with mobile
development libraries included. At the heart of its consensus mechanism lies a BFT
consortium-based consensus algorithm, dubbed Sumeragi, that establishes consensus at
transaction level and takes into account a peer reputation protocol to choose the order
of nodes that get to process transactions, able to tolerate f faults with over 3f + 1 nodes.
Its throughput is presumably high (estimated over 1000 tps), ledger replication is done
globally (network-wide) and it ensures a strongly consistent, totally ordered SMR view
computation. It does not provide privacy or anonymity guarantees in its current version.
As with other Hyperledger platforms, with the exception of Fabric, Iroha has a small
yet active community (around 500 stars and 150 forks on Github). Its documentation is,
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however, rather poor. Iroha also implements its own version of smart contracts – chaincode
– written in Java and executed against the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) on sandboxed
environments present in each node. As with EVM contracts, these are also extensible.
2.4.5 Counterparty and Bitcoin
Bitcoin, despite not being intended as a platform, has long gained community interest for
being the original proponent of blockchain technology and its most successful use-case.
Purposefully implemented limitations of Bitcoin due to security implications made it a
poor candidate for anything other than cryptocurrency, but interest to extend it prevailed.
Enter Counterparty [19], an open-source platform built upon Bitcoin, enabling smart
contracts to be run on Bitcoin’s blockchain by borrowing the EVM. In broad terms,
Counterparty shares exactly the same blockchain as Bitcoin, even piggy-backing on its
proof-of-work consensus, but smart contracts can only be interpreted by Counterparty.
Despite this added functionality, this platform’s architecture is the original architec-
ture of Bitcoin, and it can almost be seen as a smart contract layer. Therefore it is a
permissionless and completely decentralized blockchain platform that suffers from the
same scalability and privacy issues as its predecessor. Its documentation is actually very
complete and it has a small but active community working on the project, with around
200 stars and 150 forks on Github.
2.4.6 Multichain
The Multichain platform [33], as the name suggests, was built to support multiple per-
missioned chains running in parallel. Like Burrow, consensus is run at blockchain level
and not in a unified service for all chains. However, Multichain supports chain interoper-
ability, and transactions in one chain can be used to trigger transactions in the other.
Multichain’s consensus is consortium-based, restricted to a subset of nodes that ex-
ecute a custom crash fault-tolerant algorithm in which a single leader is selected on a
round-robin policy for each block being added to a chain. This ensures fairness and a
high throughput scalability, achieving over 1000 tps on standard conditions, but does
not provide BFT and partially centralizes consensus. Nodes update their system view
in an eventually consistent, totally ordered SMR process. Transaction confidentiality is
retained by encrypting data exchanged between peers through public-key cryptography
and by isolating different private contexts into different chains. Regarding anonymity,
Multichain employs a mechanism that allows each peer to transact using different public-
keys in an attempt to frustrate an attacker into tracing a known key.
The community behind Multichain is relatively small (around 300 stars and 100 forks
on Hithub) but active. The project is open-source and its documentation is of mediocre
quality, providing high level insight of the system. The downside of this platform is the
inability of providing the developer a programming model to develop custom policies and




Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the properties of each platform according to the character-
istics highlighted in the beginning of this section.






(appr. Github metrics) Active Programming model
Extensible
smart contracts
Ethereum 3 Rich Large(10000 stars, 3000 forks) 3 EVM smart contracts 3
Quorum 3 Rich Medium(1500 stars, 300 forks) 3 EVM smart contracts 3
Hydrachain 3 Poor Small(250 stars, 100 forks) 7
EVM smart contracts
or native Python 3
Hyperledger
Fabric V1 3 Rich
Large














(500 stars, 150 forks) 3 JVM chaincode 3
Counterparty 3 Rich Small(200 stars, 150 forks) 3 EVM smart contracts 3
Multichain 3 Mediocre Small(300 stars, 100 forks) 3 Not supported 7
Table 2.1: Comparison of blockchain platforms: Software Engineering and Expressiveness
and Programming Support
From Table 2.1, we can infer that most of these platforms, despite documentation
issues, can be successfully used to build decentralized applications. Two platforms stand
out for their flaws, namely, Hydrachain and Multichain. Hydrachain seems to have lost
momentum from its contributors and community, and Multichain does not accept a
generic programming model useful enough for implementing custom business logic, los-
ing interest for anything other than financial use-cases.
From Table 2.2, we can clearly see a correlation between consensus mechanisms,
decentralization and throughput scalability: platforms using proof-of-work, while bene-
fiting from a fully decentralized consensus, suffer from low throughput (Ethereum and
Counterparty). Other platforms override the original proof-of-work mechanism with a
federated group of nodes or an off-chain service, resulting in partial decentralization but
better throughput. In terms of privacy and anonymity, most platforms do not provide
any guarantees, while HLF and Burrow provide transaction privacy (although Burrow’s
approach is simply separating data in different non-interoperable chains and therefore
inferior to Fabric’s), and Quorum and Multichain provide both transaction privacy and
anonymity. Pluggable consensus is supported only by HLF, Quorum and Sawtooth. Over-
all, the most complete platforms that can be used to build dependable privacy-concerned
decentralized applications able to yield a high throughput are Quorum and Fabric.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of blockchain platforms: System Architecture
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2.5 Threshold Signatures for Blockchain Transactions
In this section, we enter into detail on a group-oriented cryptographic construction that
can be leveraged for our objective – threshold signatures – with the intent of providing
cooperative and decentralized transaction signing and verification processes into what
we understand to be the traditional blockchain architecture. First, we discuss threshold
signatures definitions and current applications. Then, we discuss on the possible use,
advantages and eventual obstacles of their use in a blockchain.
2.5.1 Threshold Signatures
Threshold signatures (or (t,n)-Threshold Cryptographic Digital Signatures) [11, 21, 22]
are cryptographic constructions that enable the distribution of secret information (i.e.
secret keys or secret key shares) and digital signature computation (generation and de-
cryption for verification) between a number of parties n, in order to remove a single point
of failure or the dependency of a single point of trust within a system. The goal is to
allow any subset of more than t parties to jointly reconstruct a secret or perform the re-
quired computation while preserving security, even in the presence of an active adversary,
which can corrupt up to t (threshold) parties. The security notion for threshold signa-
tures requires that no polynomial-time adversary that corrupts any t parties can learn
any information about the secret key or forge a valid signature on a new message of its
choice.
In order to be able to build a threshold signature, a secret key is broken apart into
secret shares and distributed among n parties, with the help of a trusted dealer or by
running an interactive protocol among all involved parties. To sign a message M, any
subset of more than t parties can use their shares of the secret and execute an interactive
signature generation protocol. The output of such protocol is a signature of M that can be
verified by any peer, using an unique fixed public-key corresponding to the above shares.
An important property of any threshold signature scheme is robustness. Robustness
requires that even t malicious parties that deviate from the protocol cannot prevent it
from generating a recognizable valid signature, as shown in Figure 2.4. Another useful
property of threshold signature schemes is proactiveness. Proactiveness relates to the
possibility of periodic refreshment of secret shares, to protect a system from an adversary
that builds-up knowledge of a secret by several attempted progressive break-ins to several
locations. In general, the main goals of threshold signature constructions are to provably
achieve the following properties: i) to support as high a threshold t as possible; ii) to
decentralize digital signature generation and verification; iii) to be robust and useful;
iv) to allow the use as a proactive scheme; and v) to be efficient enough in terms of
computation, interaction and length of the shares.
In the related work of proposals for threshold signature schemes, we can find several
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Figure 2.4: Message signing via a threshold signature sheme (from [69])
relevant contributions [22, 23, 29, 30, 34, 57, 65]. Despite the fact that some of these con-
tributions are more particularly concerned with theoretical foundations, the proposals of
[21, 34] lack security proofs, and the schemes of [22, 23] are considered as non-robust,
while those of [29, 57] are considered until today as robust and proactive schemes. How-
ever, it is well known that such schemes are always sources of a high amount of interaction,
and must be addressed carefully for scalability purposes. For a more practical approach
in the domain of our thesis, we focus on threshold Digital Signature Standard (DSS) signa-
tures, proposed in [30], and on robust threshold RSA signatures, proposed in [65], since
both are recognizably robust and have well-known practical implementations.
The threshold DSS signature in [30] is theoretically considered robust and does not
require a trusted dealer. It consists of a proof of security without the random oracle
assumption. The proposal deals with technical difficulties such as combining shares of
two secrets into shares of the product of these secrets and producing shares of a reciprocal
of a secret given shares of this secret. To achieve robustness, this type of threshold
signature uses the error-correction techniques of Berlekamp and Welch [75]. As a result,
the threshold DSS can only tolerate t < n/4 malicious parties, requires a lot of interaction
and the complexity increases considerably related to the base signature scheme. The
scheme can be made proactive following the methods of [36, 37].
The robust threshold RSA signature scheme proposal [65] is proven secure in the
random oracle model. It can tolerate t < n/2 malicious parties and the signature gener-
ation algorithm is non-interactive. This scheme requires a trusted dealer to run the key
generation protocol. The public-key uses an RSA modulus that is a product of two safe
primes and the protocol utilizes zero-knowledge proofs in the random oracle model in
order to achieve robustness. Proactiveness is not considered in [65], even that it can be
addressed, orthogonally.
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2.5.2 Applications of Threshold Signatures
Distributed trust has been a key motivation for threshold signatures. Shamir [65] argued
early in 1979 about the relevance of threshold cryptography for key management and
distribution protocols. Storing a key in a single location is not robust, but keeping multi-
ple copies of the same key opens the possibility for security breaches. Overall, no single
entity should be trusted to keep the secret key for a particular signature.
For instance, in [58, 80], the introduction of threshold cryptography is motivated
by the replication of distributed services in a way that preserves the availability and
correctness properties of the system and maintains causality of requests, even if several
replicas are corrupted. In the specific context of [58], threshold cryptography allows a
client to maintain one public-key for the replicated service, instead of one public-key
for each replica. The client does not need more storage and does not undergo a higher
computational cost than in the case of a non-replicated service, regarding authenticated
messages from a transparent trustable peer-group membership of distributed processes.
Following the same idea of [58], the motivation in [13] is to define an architecture
for distributing trusted services in a fully asynchronous environment supported over
the Internet. This architecture includes fully decentralized certification authorities (CA),
distributed secure directories, or, in more concrete examples, fully decentralized and
trustable DNS services. The advantages of threshold signatures for DNS are also further
addressed in [14]. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) use a technique called zone signing
to provide authentication for replies from the DNS name resolution service, with the
private key for signing the zone stored locally in some entity in the network. This single
entity introduces reliability and security issues as it is a single point of failure. To tackle
this issue, the proposal of [14] is to use a threshold RSA signature scheme to securely
replicate the authoritative servers in the context of zone signing replies.
2.5.3 Decentralized Blockchain Transactions and Verification
In summary, threshold cryptography is a powerful tool that has been widely explored
as a more secure approach for service replication. We believe that the use of this tool in
blockchain platforms will be a relevant step in achieving fully decentralized ledgering
and reducing trustability assumptions. In fact, Goldfeder et al. [32] already discussed
the possible advantages of leveraging threshold signatures for Bitcoin wallets.
The design and implementation of threshold signatures in a blockchain ecosystem
must be carefully addressed to provide the required balance for scalability, performance
and improved decentralization guarantees. However, this must be designed and imple-
mented without sacrificing throughput or latency conditions. To do so, on one hand,
we can restrict membership control conditions in order that only a subgroup of nodes
will be involved in signing and validation processes, also considering that we can have
different subgroups involved. On the other hand, we can use implementation schemes for
threshold signatures using lightweight cryptographic primitives, such as ECDSA-based
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threshold signatures or possible hardware implementations at least in certain nodes of
the blockchain.
Another option is to follow the ongoing research on the optimization and efficiency
of threshold schemes for multiparty computations [8]. Finally, another relevant design
option is to explore synchronized forms of aggregated signatures (or aggregated multi-
signatures – ASM), minimizing the number of rounds for verification processes, as pro-
posed for the optimization of BLS multi-signatures [9]. These constructions support both
signature compression and public-key aggregation, allowing to verify that a number of
parties signed a common message m. The verifier only needs a short multi-signature, a
short aggregation of their public keys, and the message m. In [9], the authors present
constructions that are derived from Schnorr signatures and from BLS signatures, and the
possible adoption in a blockchain. With such ASM schemes any subset S of a set of n
parties can sign a message m so that a valid signature discloses which subset generated
the signature (hence the subset S is accountable for signing m). ASM schemes can achieve
signature sizes of only O(k) bits over the description of S, where k is the security parame-
ter. Similarly, the aggregated public-key is only O(k) bits, and is completely independent
of n.
For the context of our thesis, the lack of availability of those recent schemes in tangi-
ble implementations is an issue. Thus, an interesting practical would be to use generic
models for threshold signatures schemes while bearing modularity and extensibility de-
sign assumptions in mind. This would allow the possible use of cryptographic providers
implementing such schemes (e.g. through libraries libraries) in a pluggable and possible
object-factory implementation in the future, without compromising other system model
assumptions. Such approach must tackle the way how group signatures can be mapped
together with Byzantine fault-tolerance properties and the used mechanisms at the con-
sensus plane level of the blockchain platform at use. This is one relevant direction in our
proposed solution and implementation.
In [69], the authors present a study of the practical use of threshold signatures, namely
threshold RSA [65] and threshold BLS, for the HLF [42]. Both are non-interactive and
deterministic schemes. The authors concluded that leveraging one of such schemes for
Fabric does not cause any relevant negative impact on the system, therefore being equiva-
lent to the non-threshold version of the scheme and allowing for a seamless integration.
The authors also expressed some concerns, performance-wise, in anticipating the use of
RSA threshold signatures, which are more efficient than BLS according to the authors,
alternatively to ECDSA multi-signatures, since the use of ECDSA multi-signatures can
scale better for an increasing number of nodes. A final relevant point is that in threshold
signature schemes a validator needs to validate only one signature, whereas for multi-
signatures the number of the signatures that must be validated increases linearly with the
number of participants. Identically, threshold signatures always have a fixed size, while




We believe that current IoT architectures need to be revisited and that blockchains can
provide truly resilient systems with no single point of failure. However, we find it un-
likely that blockchain technology will integrally replace the role of clouds as part of IoT
architectures but will rather work as an add-in for decentralized ledgering that can be
used to ensure privacy, robustness and security for every endpoint. The architecture
methodologies presented by [24, 64] are a relevant point for our goals, since they present
blockchains as an intermediary layer between IoT devices and the cloud and remove the
weight of the blockchain protocol away from the IoT, as well as the edge computing mod-
els proposed in [10] to provide better scalability and privacy for IoT systems and give
back some control to the users while reducing stress on cloud services.
We intend to stand our research upon an existing platform that emphasizes on high
throughput scalability, possibility for BFT, confidentiality and decentralization; yet, we
wish to retain the ability of our system model to be agnostic to a permissioned blockchain
platform implementation. Our justification for these characteristics is that an ideal de-
centralized IoT system is supposed to behave in near real-time, while still being robust
against potential adversaries and preserving privacy. We require consensus pluggability
for benchmarking performance with BFT and non-BFT consensus in combination with
threshold signature schemes for transaction verification and accept on compromising
with a partially decentralized platform by prioritizing throughput scalability in detri-
ment of full decentralization. Moreover, the use of open-source blockchains, addressing
a modular permissioned model designed to support pluggable implementations of dif-
ferent components, such as the consensus and membership services as two separated
concerns, is an important consideration for building an extensible decentralized ledger-
ing platform. These requirements are what guides our system model as to allow any
generic base blockchain platform that assures them to be used for a blockchain-enabled
IoT architecture.
However, for our implementation we need a concrete blockchain platform that imple-
ments such requirements. From our summary in Section 2.4, our best candidates would
be Quorum or HLF. Both improve over the original transaction flow and ledger replica-
tion of the blockchain, whilst providing strong consistency with a totally ordered message
delivery. However, our decision was HLF for a few reasons: i) it provides the notion of
channels and multiple chains, which can be used to isolate transactions between several
peers in a straightforward way. Quorum is only able to split traffic between a private and
a public network; ii) it has a larger community than Quorum and finds more academic
and scientific usage than other platforms [69]; and iii) despite not providing anonymity
as Quorum does, we find that this property is more relevant in scenarios where public
transactions exist. Since Fabric is permissioned and allows for private channels to be
set up, this property becomes irrelevant for our case. We also find that it is possible to
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execute the HLF’s off-chain consensus mechanism without depending on a single third-
party and risk centralizing the network, as a consortium of entities responsible for the
decentralized management of the ordering service can be established.
Our idea is to follow on the discussion of [69] and add a fully decentralized group-
oriented signature verification process of transactions and smart contracts, integrating
threshold signatures as a base component of a given blockchain platform and its sup-
ported services, providing participant nodes with the functionality to generate and verify,
in a distributed manner, a single fault-tolerant signature. Nevertheless, we believe that
the definition of which signature scheme to use for a given set of transactions should
be dynamic and decided by the participating entities interacting between themselves
and that multiple schemes can be harnessed by a single platform as to adapt to multi-
ple use-cases and scenarios of the IoT paradigm. The ability of specifying and allowing
participants: users, service providers, IoT devices and even edge-based smart hubs [10],
to scrutinize such system properties – which signature schemes will be used and which
nodes will endorse a given transaction – is a powerful and interesting concept, and one
that can be leveraged through the use of a smart contract specification. There is also the
need to to assess the throughput of a blockchain platform assuring both decentralized
trustability assumptions and Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus guarantees. Further, it
is vital to compare the performance of threshold signature schemes with existing multi-
signature ones, taking into account scalability concerns related to peer interaction and
signature size, which can be done through the use of a smart contract specification for










System Model and Architecture
In this chapter we present our system model proposal for a decentralized and scalable
ledgering system that can be built upon an existing blockchain platform with exten-
sible smart contracts support. The idea is to address a model and foundations for a
blockchain-enabled IoT platform. We start by providing an application scenario for an
easier comprehension on the applications of our system model, then we will go into its
details, architecture and corresponding software components, and finally present some
considerations regarding the threat model of the system and expected runtime behaviour.
3.1 Application Scenario
We can imagine a scenario to better clarify the addressed system model presented next. In
our scenario, a user requests a vacation rental through a provider that offers such service,
like Airbnb. Likewise, imagine that every apartment in this fictitious rental service
is equipped with smart things – smart door locks, smart lighting, smart appliances –
connected to a smart hub that requires a confirmation from the service stating that the
user which intends to access the apartment has payed the price of the rental (and in the
correct amount) in order to comply with his commands.
To rent an apartment, a user uses a smartphone linked to his credit card or his bank
account and executes a transaction between him and the service. The service verifies
the transaction and returns an identifier for the user to present to the apartment’s smart
hub, which can communicate directly with the user’s smartphone and with the rental
service. The user then presents its identifier to the hub, which in turn contacts the service
to confirm the identifier’s validity. If it checks out, the user’s identity is proven and he’s
given permission to use the apartment and interact with the hub.
The problem with this architecture is that a fraudulent service could try to maximize
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its profits by accepting a payment from a user but not returning a proof of payment to him
or notifying the smart hub of the reservation. Or it could accept two transactions from
different users for the same dates, and purposefully reject confirmation requests from
the hub for one of them. The problem could even be that the service itself is actually not
fraudulent, but a malicious system administrator is behind the attack and is manipulating
the system. Either way, the affected user would have difficulty proving he payed for the
apartment if records were logged only on the providers side – the Byzantine party in this
situation. And even though our example is based on a scenario where the most likely
party to behave fraudulently or erroneously would be the provider, in other scenarios any
other entity could be the Byzantine one, including the user or the smart hub.
Hence, what we propose is a ledger between these parties to provably ensure which
transactions took place and when, by using a blockchain to represent these parties and






















Figure 3.1: Application scenario of the intermediary ledger
In this new architecture, a user, represented here by its smartphone U , communicates
with a rental service application server S (1) to obtain information, price, and terms and
conditions of the rental. S returns this information along with an identifier for a contract
deployed on the blockchain, which U has to comply and interact with. This contract shall
specify terms and conditions of the rental process and of the transactions to be executed
within the context of the rental. In this scenario, the contract was previously deployed on
the blockchain by the provider. U emits a transaction to the blockchain with the intent
to rent the apartment, represented by the smart hub H . The transaction is encrypted and
signed by U , and sent to a set of nodes (2) specified on the contract which validate the
transaction according to the contracts properties, and if successful, sign the transaction
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as a way of endorsing it. Then, the signed transaction is propagated throughout network
nodes (3), registered to the blockchain and the contract it is associated to regulates the
succeeding workflow steps. The transaction result eventually reaches S (4), which can
query the its known broker nodes and decrypt the transaction (for now, assume broker
nodes to be simply blockchain nodes in direct communication with a given party). If
the transaction checks out on S’s off-chain validations, S can then reply to U that it has
successfully received the transaction via the blockchain cluster (5), in a similar process
to the first transaction, which U would then be able to query. When the user reaches the
apartment, he communicates with H for it to open the door (6). H will then verify if a
previous transaction from U exists within the blockchain representing the user’s payment
of the rental (7), and validates its information according to the contract specifications. In
the end, H commands A (the door) to open (8), and the user gets access to the apartment
he payed for.
The potential behind this ledger is that any of the participating parties can consult its
brokers and audit any transaction that has happened in the past, preventing fraudulent
behaviour and ensuring non-repudiation as transactions are witnessed and endorsed by
several peers in the blockchain. It presents itself as an intermediary system and can be
integrated with today’s popular cloud-first applications for added robustness.
3.2 System Model
Before we burrow into detailing our system model, let us focus on formalizing the par-
ticipating parties of our system and defining an entity model capable of mapping their
relationships accordingly. Afterwards, we will describe the foreseen interactions between
these entities in our system model, define base and extended models for such interactions,
define system model requirements according to the needs of these entities and the needs
of the interaction flow, and finally detail our devised architecture and its components.
3.2.1 Entities
A Thing. A device or equipment, equipped with computing and network connectivity
hardware, capable of executing simple processing tasks and communicate with other
devices and computers via some network. Also referred to as a smart thing, a smart
device or an IoT device (e.g. a sensor capable of receiving commands and sending alerts
through the Internet or some other kind of network).
The Service Provider. The party responsible for supplying the means and resources
for a given service (e.g. apartment or bike rentals, toll services, digital identity services,
etc.). The service provider, or simply provider, is responsible for implementing and
deploying a smart contract to the blockchain expressing any applicational rules necessary
for providing its service to costumers, and is usually instantiated by an application server
(or similar) sited on a cloud-centric infrastructure.
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The User. The actual user interacting with the system, generally through a smart-
phone or a similar device. As such, in our system model we may sometimes represent the
actual user as its representative medium – the smartphone. The user is the consumer of
a service provided by the service provider and information transacted between the user
and the provider is recorded on the blockchain.
The Smart Hub. A piece of hardware deployed on the edge capable of executing some
resource-intensive tasks that are not suitable to be executed on edge devices with lesser
computing capacity, such as smart things. Smart hubs can aggregate data on the edge
and perform some sort of computation and even cryptographic services before sending
information to cloud services. Smart hubs may be either hardware owned by users (e.g.
a smart home hub interconnecting TV, lights, loudspeakers, etc.) or owned by service
providers for the purpose of providing specialized services (e.g. a smart hub controlling
a bicycle rack platform on a street for magnetically unlocking bikes upon user payment
via their smartphone). In the first case, it is possible that users may be able to install
several applications and custom software into their smart hubs. Either way, the smart
hub presents itself as an intermediary between the user and the provider and any edge
devices the hub may need to control and receive information from. It acts as a proxy
agent for storing and reading information from a persistency layer. In our system model,
this persistency layer is the blockchain.
We must notice that in a generic perspective, the Smart Hub is seen as an intelligent
gateway that can be designed to be a pluggable computing software/hardware appli-
ance, where different modules can be installed for running on top of an hardened OS. A
possible idea is to look at such modules as virtualized and isolated pluggable software
containers, dedicated to their specific functions (e.g. data aggregation and traffic filtering
functions using, for instance, tainted-data analysis mechanisms to avoid undesirable data
exfiltration/infiltration, inter-networking firewall functions, cryptographic processing
functions or other application-specific modules for particular IoT devices).
Another kind of modules would be related with the provision of multiple protocols,
suitable for serving specific and distinct IoT environments. This would allow address-
ing different subsets of IoT standards, from wired or wireless network infrastructure
identification and addressing levels, transport-level, discovery and data-dissemination
protocols, to request/response under remote-calling operation environments, and data-
semantic and representation protocols, including possible protocol-conversion features
[48]. In a complete design and implementation of such smart hubs, those protocols can
be addressed in the context of multi-layer frameworks, targeted for different IoT markets,
devices, and applications. However, we are more interested in regarding smart hubs, for
implementation purposes, as possible low-cost software/hardware appliances capable
of acting as gateway services to the blockchain supporting local-operation REST-based




The Blockchain. The composition of all services, hardware and software which com-
pose a blockchain. Generally, a blockchain is a cluster of server nodes communicating
between themselves through a peer-to-peer network holding local copies of a ledger data
structure where transactions are recorded. The blockchain presents itself as the backbone
of our system model and is the main storage layer of the system where all participating
entities read/write from, either directly or indirectly.
3.2.2 Interactions
Base Model. We start with a base model for what we foresee as the most adequate scenario
for establishing a blockchain and contract-based service in an IoT-based environment.
For our base model, illustrated in Figure 3.2, we consider that users, through their smart-
phones or another type of mediums, contact the blockchain intermediated by a smart
hub. This type of model better fits the IoT environment of smart homes, where there is
typically a hub device responsible for controlling and obtaining information from user-
owned assets (e.g. an ISP box controlling TV, telephone and acting as a Internet switch,
or a smarter hub controlling lighting, stereo, heaters, etc.). We also consider that the ser-
vice providers only job is to deploy and manage smart contracts operating directly with
the blockchain. Note that we consider the blockchain not to be an asset of the service
provider, albeit this could be a possible situation in a real scenario (imagine it as being a
consortium between several providers with shared cloud server farms).










Figure 3.2: Base interaction model
Following on Figure 3.2, the interaction flow of the base model is as follows:
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1. The Service Provider deploys a smart contract for a given service, stating terms and
conditions of the service, of the transactions to be executed over the contract and
how they are digitally signed and verified by nodes in the service;
2. The User, after outside communication with the provider which allowed him to
obtain an identifier for a given contract, requests the contract to the Smart Hub.
The Smart Hub then either has the contract in cache (from a previous interaction)
or requests it from the Blockchain. In the end, the smart contract is returned to the
user, which allows him to view and agree with terms and conditions.
3. The User agrees with the contract, digitally signs it, and forwards it to the Smart
Hub, which in turn may verify the signature and forward it to the Blockchain. The
Blockchain can then either confirm the operation or not (it could fail if the contract
was already signed or if there was some application error triggering an invalid state).
This process of registering the contract to the Blockchain means that the User has
accepted the contract and this action is irrevocable and non-repudiable.
4. The User then executes transactions over the contract. Transaction requests are for-
warded to the Smart Hub, which in turn, redirects them to the Blockchain (possibly
in a format understandable to the Blockchain), and returns results back to the User.
5. IoT Devices (or Things) linked with the Smart Hub can perform transaction requests
to the Smart Hub as well (e.g. a temperature sensor recording Celsius to the ledger,
thereby sending a transaction for each temperature reading) or execute queries
over data on the ledger (e.g. a lightbulb checking if it should turn on/off). In
this illustration, we consider that IoT devices would obtain information from the
Blockchain by polling the Smart Hub, but a Smart Hub could also easily implement
an event-based approach that would send information to trigger IoT devices.
Extended Model. Now, let us describe a more complex scenario where users also
can directly contact the blockchain independently of using a Smart Hub. In this model,
the user’s medium, the smartphone or other device, has all the needed information and
applications to contact the blockchain directly. Note that this feature is not mutually
exclusive of the previous model. At home, a user could still use his smart hub to contact
the blockchain for a contract regulating smart home services. Outside, he could rent
a bicycle via an automated bicycle rack that would require him to contact a smart hub
belonging to the service provider of bicycle rents. The advantage of this feature is for
situations such as the one in our application scenario – an apartment renting service. It
would be illogical that for renting an apartment the user would have to contact a hub to
do so. It seems impractical that he would contact his home hub, the rental apartment’s
hub, or even some kind of open community hub just to perform the actual rent when
he could do it himself directly, as modern applications allow you to do today. Thus, the
ability to interact with the blockchain directly is vital to achieve a pervasive system.
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Another important feature of this extended model, omitted from the base model
above, is the ability of service providers remotely configuring smart hubs to some degree,
something which can be expected in real case scenarios, especially in cases of hubs that are
placed at users homes but are actually owned by the provider for which the user rents the
equipment for a fee, or in cases where the service provider has to update and administrate
hubs in public areas, such as the hubs on bicycle racks example. These configurations
fall under the scope of updating firmware, configuring the interaction procedures with
the blockchain, adding new functionalities or deploying contracts directly to the hub.
The extended model can visualized on Figure 3.3.









1) deploy(contract) & configure
...
Figure 3.3: Extended interaction model
In this case, the interaction flow is as follows:
1. The Service Provider deploys a smart contract on the Blockchain in a fashion similar
to the previous model. However, it can also remotely deploy the contract directly to
a Smart Hub and perform some miscellaneous configurations. Imagine the Smart
Hub is owned by the provider and is situated inside a apartment up for rental. Ad-
ditionally, imagine that hub was configured to only use the most recently deployed
contract and that all IoT Devices queries/transactions to the Smart Hub shall be
routed to that contract’s rules and functions.
2-4. The User, which could be on foot and outside, directly obtains a contract from
the Blockchain to a service he previously got information from a Service Provider.
Agreeing with the terms of the contract, he signs and returns it to the blockchain,
and then performs some transactions as he sees fit, all without depending on a
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Smart Hub. Let us imagine he accepted a contract stating rental conditions and
afterwards executed the payment for the rent.
5. An IoT Device that most likely has no idea of what is a smart contract, contacts a
nearby Smart Hub, which has been updated and configured by the Service Provider.
Imagine it to be a heater intended at heating the apartment 15 minutes before a
guest arrives that is trying to get the current time from the hub and know when
does a guest arrive. The Smart Hub can then check its contained smart contract
used to regulate rentals, query the blockchain for signed contracts to identify future
guests and their expected time of arrival, and reply to the IoT Device. Overall,
the User was independent of communication with the Smart Hub for this process,
and the Hub was able to respond directly to the needs of IoT Devices through the
configuration made by the Service Provider.
3.2.3 Requirements
While the scenario described in Section 3.1 is merely illustrative, the previous sections
exemplify the ability of such a system to apply to different application-specific business
needs. However, in order to present a generic system model, useful for any kind of IoT
application, we need to derive some requirements on what we intend to achieve of our
system model. As such, our system model should1:
R0 Allow for replicated tamper-resistant and cryptographically-secured persistent stor-
age of data and information.
R1 Be scalable in terms of the number of applications concurrently deployed on the
system, without major performance or functionality degradation with an increased
number of service provider applications.
R2 Be scalable in terms of the number of users concurrently reading and writing infor-
mation on the system, without major performance or functionality degradation with
an increased number of users, independently of the number of existing applications.
R3 Support BFT on consensus, data persistency, read/write operations, transaction au-
thentication, signing and verification processes, enabling for trustable and resilient
ledgering, where erroneous behaviour or deliberate attacks targeting the system as
a whole, the operation of IoT environments, or users, does not succeed in compro-
mising the system and endangering its users.
R4 Be decentralized in terms of trust, allowing data to be cryptographically signed and
verified by multiple entities in a fault-tolerant fashion, and allow the system to be
deployed in an environment that does not promote vendor lock-in and infrastruc-
tural or organization centralization and control.
1We will refer to each requirement by its respective identifier (R0, R1, ..., Rn) on the following sections.
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R5 Ensure clear identification of the participating entities in the network and ensure
non-repudiation of operations to its persistency mechanism by any involved party.
R6 Allow for the auditability of any operation executed in the past by any participating
party independently and allow the traceability of that operation to a transaction, to
a contract and to an entity.
R7 Be able to present itself as a generic platform for several customizable application
contexts, each with different business needs.
R8 Allow service providers to express a form of extended smart contracts that state a
set of terms and conditions to be accepted by users, and be capable of interpreting
such contract at both application-level (business-specific functions, such as price of
a rental) and system-level (signing policies to use, smart contract identifier on the
blockchain, consensus mechanism to use, and other properties), acting accordingly.
R9 Allow complete execution of the protocol without degrading IoT devices perfor-
mance or overall experience, despite of resource limitations, and without degrading
the protocol’s efficiency and performance by the presence of resource-limited de-
vices in the system.
R10 Enable the scalability of cloud providers (given the exponential ever-growing num-
bers of the IoT) by providing a model capable of aggregating IoT devices and data
on the edge and being deployed heterogeneously across providers, thereby also
avoiding centralization by vendor lock-in.
3.3 Reference Architecture
Our proposed system poses as a robust mediator between several participating devices
enabling cryptographically-secured auditability and non-repudiation of transactions by
any of the involved parties. To achieve this in terms of architecture, we devised a mid-
dleware set of services over a generic layer of base blockchain services we refer to as
extended blockchain services. Then, we devised a higher-level applicational interface
– an API – composed by several sub-components intended at being deployed within a
smart hub for it to be able to perform the expected interactions of our system model.
Together, these three layers, illustrated on Figure 3.4, make up a fully fledged system
capable of responding to the needs of external parties: users, their devices, things, and
service providers. As our system model is essentially a distributed system over a peer-to-
peer network, this architecture is to be viewed from the perspective of a single smart hub
and a single node present on a blockchain network in communication with the hub, with
each sibling blockchain node and sharing the same set of components.
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Components added by our system model
Figure 3.4: Architectural view of the system
Base Blockchain Services. Our system model intends to be independent of a single
blockchain platform. Yet, we have to consider the generic functionalities given by vir-
tually every blockchain platform to clearly identify which blockchain components we
may need to extend, add or use as-is, according to the requirements in Subsection 3.2.3.
This system model is oriented to blockchain platforms harnessing consortium-like con-
sensus, rather than proof-of-work. In general, such platforms expose a low-level API
on each node for executing read or write operations over a ledger. This API interprets
requests, processes them, and passes them on to a core orchestration component we call a
transaction manager. The transaction manager has access to a wide array of components
to execute the operation required by the incoming request, including components for
system administration and smart contract deployment by service providers. Standard
blockchain transaction flow for a write operation usually requires that the incoming re-
quest is transformed into a blockchain transaction and is verified and executed against
a smart contract engine/execution logic, without necessarily persisting the result of the
execution of the contract on the ledger. These execution and verification processes can be
done by multiple nodes, requiring the transaction manager to propagate the transaction
to the peer-to-peer network, or by a single node, depending on the platform at hand. The
transaction is then, generally, signed by the nodes that are verifying it and a consensus al-
gorithm is executed. Upon reaching consensus, signed transactions are propagated across
the network, executed against the smart contract engine and persisted to the replicated
ledger after successful verification of its signatures by peer nodes. This layer is respon-
sible for ensuring requirements R0, R6 and R7, and most blockchain platforms already
provide some form of node identification through public-key cryptography, ensuring R5.
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Extended Blockchain Services. At the next level of our architecture sits the extended
blockchain services layer. This layer is responsible for enriching the base blockchain ser-
vices layer with mechanisms for further decentralizing trust in transaction endorsement
and signing processes, for providing a consensus service capable of tolerating Byzantine
behaviour, for implementing, together with the base blockchain services layer, the broker
mechanism, and finally, for providing an engine with enriched smart contract execution
logic to execute what we define as extended smart contracts – contracts specifying not
only the business logic of different applications, but also system properties that nodes
should be able interpret and execute accordingly to conclude the required operation (e.g.
imagine a transaction that has to be signed using decentralized trustability assumptions
from five trusted and known nodes listed on the contract). The concept of a broker mech-
anism is fairly simple and was introduced in the application scenario in Section 3.1. The
idea behind it is to use a set of blockchain server nodes to represent entities external to
the blockchain, which are, in essence, clients of the service. Thus, a broker is a blockchain
node that is known to an entity to which it requests blockchain operations to be per-
formed (queries, transaction proposals, etc.). A node that is not acting upon an entity’s
request is not a broker node and is simply supporting the peer-to-peer network. This ap-
proach ensures R9 as all resource-intensive tasks related to operating the blockchain are
offloaded from the actual edge devices to resource-wise capable server nodes that broker
operations for them. It allows an aggregation of smart hubs and edge devices (the latter
only on the extended model) to a single broker, enabling for a more scalable approach to
the system that doesn’t require an exceptionally high number of nodes to manage within
the ledgering system, therefore aiding in complying with R1 and R2. However, ensur-
ing these two requirements is dependant on the base blockchain platform to be used, as
the inner operation of the blockchain protocol heavily impacts scalability. As such, the
comparison of blockchain platforms in Section 2.4 is a significant factor to be taken into
account. This layer is also the basis for compliance with requirements R3, R4, R8.
Smart Hub Interface. At the final level of the architecture the smart hub interface
can be found. The purpose of this layer is to provide a high-level interface for edge
devices to attach to in order to make use of the decentralized ledgering system. This layer
is what allows the aggregation of data, devices and users and computation on the edge,
ensuring R10, as it allows a far more scalable alternative to cloud-first architectures in
which all devices communicate directly with a cloud service. This layer is responsible
for holding and partially interpreting the properties of extended smart contracts built by
service providers (partially because the remaining part of the smart contract logic is to be
executed in the lower layers). Upon successful interpretation of a contract, the smart hub
interface makes use of a dispatcher component that orchestrates communication with
the blockchain’s nodes for the remainder of the protocol. An important distinction to
make in our system model is how would this layer operate for the extended interaction
model versus the base interaction model. In the base model we restrict communication
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between edge devices and the blockchain to be routed through this API, however, for the
extended model, it would be necessary that for edge devices to be able to communicate
with the blockchain they would have to implement a similar layer of components (contract
interpreter, dispatcher module, extended signing policies verifier) as to ensure the same
capabilities of a smart hub. Naturally, this would only apply to devices that have a
reasonable amount of hardware resources (e.g. smartphones) and not by cheap resource-
constricted IoT devices such as temperature sensors and the like that would not be capable
of communicating directly with the blockchain. The other feature of the extended model
is that the service provider would be able, through some sort of backdoor, to configure
smart hubs, as illustrated on the architecture diagram.
Computing environment. It is our intention with the definition of this architecture
to achieve a modular system, in which nodes can be heterogeneous in components. This
allows the presence of auxiliary nodes on the network, i.e. nodes that may not need to
sign transactions and act as witnesses of a transaction probably do not need to have an
extended signing policies provider installed on them, or nodes that are passive to their
environment and only record information to their local ledger probably do not need a
smart contract execution logic deployed within them. As for the environment of the
system, we intend for it to be deployed throughout different cloud service providers, as
to prevent vendor lock-in and conform with R4 regarding decentralization of trust. Thus,
this approach complies with R10.
Final remark. With this model we take into account the concerns that most IoT
devices aren’t able to cope with the weight of the blockchain protocol resource-wise. We
also believe that network-wide consensus and global ledger replication are properties
that weigh in on the protocol’s scalability. In partial detriment of decentralization, a new
protocol can be built to be secure, partially-decentralized and performant simultaneously.
In addition, some blockchain platforms bring confidentiality mechanisms to transaction
processing, which can be an essential property within the scope of IoT applications. One
could imagine a network supporting a wide array of different yet related services which
remain private while still interacting with each other (booking an hotel room, requesting
room service, paying for the hotel’s restaurant, etc.), opening the potential for a wide array
of applications. Our model is inherently tied to the notions of a permissioned blockchain
setup, in which nodes could be managed between a consortium of organizations. Thus,
these criteria, along with those in Section 2.6, influence the blockchain platform we use
for our base blockchain services layer, presented in Chapter 4.
3.4 Software Architecture Components
In this section, we address the architectural components of the two uppermost layers of
our model and specify the blockchain middleware that enables Byzantine fault-tolerance
together with decentralized trustability assumptions in blockchain consensus and signa-
ture verification processes for our system model. We do not approach components of the
42
3.4. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS
base blockchain platform here as these depend on the blockchain platform being used
and on their internal specification.
3.4.1 Smart Hub Interface
Smart Hub API. This is the component that serves as an entry-point for smart hub
communication and to the decentralized ledgering system, providing a high-level API for
the entities described previously (devices on the edge). Let us define the method stubs of
the methods the API is expected to support:
• Contract getContract(contractId): Obtains a contract definition from the block-
chain stating all needed information about the contract represented by contractId;
• boolean signContract(contractId, signature): Requests to sign a given con-
tract, represented by contractId, with a user-provided signature as a form of in-
dicating acceptance of the conditions and definitions of the contract. Returns a
confirmation if the signature was committed to the ledger;
• LedgerData[] query(contractId, operationId [, queryParams]): Performs a
query operation on the ledger over a specified contract, represented by contractId,
with the possibility of stating query parameters (e.g. find by ID = 2, return all
entries previous to a timestamp, etc.). The query operation to execute is identified
by the supplied operationId (e.g. queryApartments, queryRentals);
• boolean invoke(contractId, operationId, transaction): Invokes an opera-
tion, identified by operationId (e.g. rentApartment), over a contract, represented
by contractId, and proposes a transaction to the ledger. Any arguments/param-
eters needed for the operation to execute are included within the transaction.
Returns a confirmation if the transaction was committed to the ledger.
The methods getContract and signContract are to be invoked by system users for
obtaining and accepting (signing) contracts deployed to the system by a service provider.
On the other hand, query and invoke are to be used by all edge devices: devices rep-
resenting consumers of the service, i.e. the actual users, and IoT appliances and things.
These methods objective is to allow querying the ledger state and modifying it by propos-
ing new transactions. Access control policies can apply to these methods, and in finer
granularity to the smart contract operations they invoke. However, we defer these access
control policies to be specified on the smart contract and not on the smart hub or any of
its components.
We foresee that this component may be implemented using different protocols such
as HTTP, MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) [47] or CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol) [66], giving preference to the latter two protocols for interactions
with resource-constricted devices as they are far more lightweight than standard HTTP
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and a multitude of sensors and other equipment in the market have started adopting them.
Communication could be secured with lightweight security protocols such as DTLS [59],
far more friendly for the IoT than standard TLS in terms of resource consumption. A
smart hub API could even be made to support more than one protocol and could segment
users and IoT things into each protocol (e.g. HTTP for users on their smartphones and
personal computers, CoAP and MQTT for remote sensors and actuators).
Extended Smart Contracts. The structure of what we define as an extended smart
contract is visible in Listing 3.1. Here we can see that a contract holds three essential
sections: i) a section for the properties of the base blockchain platform; ii) a section for
the extended system functionalities we intend to add to the base platform; and iii) a
section for business logic and application-specific properties. The contract also keeps
track of data related to it – the transaction log, which provides a collection of the history
of transactions executed over this contract, and the records of data stored within the
ledger related to the contract and its transactions.
Listing 3.1: Structure of an Extended Smart Contract (ASN.1 notation)
1 ExtendedSmartContractProperties DEFINITIONS : : = BEGIN
2
3 Transact ion : : = SEQUENCE {
4 Id OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
5 Payload BIT STRING
6 }
7 LedgerData : : = SEQUENCE {
8 Key OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
9 Value BIT STRING
10 }
11 BasePlatformSystemPropert ies : : = SEQUENCE {
12 ContractId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
13 TransactionLog SEQUENCE( SIZE ( 0 . . 9 9 9 ) ) OF Transaction ,
14 LedgerRecords SEQUENCE( SIZE ( 0 . . 9 9 9 ) ) OF LedgerData ,
15 . . .
16 }
17 ExtendedSystemProperties : : = SEQUENCE {
18 SignatureType INTEGER ( 0 . . 3 ) ,
19 WitnessNodes SEQUENCE( SIZE ( 0 . . 1 0 ) ) OF IA5String ,
20 . . .
21 }
22 Appl ica t ionProper t i e s : : = SEQUENCE {
23 . . .
24 }
25 END
Of course, a smart contract is not only a set of properties and data, it also provides
the functions and logic needed for it to be executed. Overall, a smart contract is a set of
stored properties together with triggerable procedures and functions. Again, the internal
logic of such functions is divided into three types: i) base platform execution logic, which
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is the boilerplate code for running the contract over a smart contract engine; ii) extended
execution logic, which is logic meant to be used for executing protocol operations ac-
cording to the extended system properties section, such as the number of nodes to sign
a transaction and what cryptographic signature types to use; iii) and finally application-
specific functions, which are to be implemented and defined by service providers before
deployment of the contract.
Our intent with this extended smart contract notion is also that there can more than
one implementation of smart contracts within the system. The whole specification of a
contract with its procedural logic and functions will always lie at the base blockchain ser-
vices layer, but at the application-level interface and extended blockchain services layers,
another view of the contract, or a subset of its information, can be used. Congruently,
the relevance of the information present in each section of the smart contract depends at
which layer it is read, as some properties will influence business data while others will
alter the overall execution of the blockchain protocol. For example, a property that indi-
cates a given set of nodes to verify and sign some transaction will influence an application
to dispatch requests only to those nodes, while a property indicating to increase a counter
variable in the contract will presumably only alter the application data.
The power of these contracts is their ability to present themselves a generic boilerplate
for mapping complex applications to smart contract logic. One can imagine a contract for
regulating transactions for electronic payments, in either a peer-to-peer fashion where no
centralized entity exists (e.g. the Bitcoin protocol) or a more structured scenario where
transactions are made between a specific set of entities, where each recipient can audit the
contents of the transaction independently without needing to know the whole contents
of the transaction, i.e. the recipient may be able to verify only a section of the transaction
relevant to its operation with every other section obfuscated to him, thus retaining privacy
control over the contents of the transaction. Advanced control flows of this transaction
can be implemented in the contract, such as requiring signatures from specific entities
in order for it to succeed. This is an example application of the SET (Secure Electronic
Transactions) protocol [68] implemented in debit/credit card payment schemes.
Applicational Contract Interpreter. This is the component responsible for partially
interpreting extended smart contracts at the smart hub interface layer. This interpretation
is executed over a view of a given smart contract which can be loaded directly from the
blockchain by its identifier. The view of a contract is simply a variation of the format of
the original smart contract, the latter being kept at the blockchain service layers, in which
only certain properties relevant for the Smart Hub Interface layer are retained (e.g. smart
contract functions are not interpreted or executed at this layer, and thus, there is no need
to pull them here). As such, this component implements a local persistent storage for the
retaining views of contracts. The need for this interpreter lies in the next component – the
dispatcher – which needs to know a certain set of properties before forwarding requests
to the appropriate nodes in the network, such as which nodes to contact, which signature
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policy should they use, which consensus service (BFT or fail-stop), and so on.
Dispatcher. The dispatcher component can be seen as the component that orches-
trates all communication with blockchain nodes, via their low-level API, in order to
achieve read or write operations over the ledger. To do so, it requires information to
be passed on to it by the applicational contract interpreter, so it can proceed to emit
requests in conformance with a given contract’s rules. Thus, the dispatcher has to be able
to request nodes to verify, sign, and commit transactions to the ledger.
3.4.2 Extended Blockchain Services
Extended Contract Execution Logic. As stated previously, our notion of extended smart
contracts requires contract’s actions to be executed at different stages of system architec-
ture. Thus, this component is meant for extending the base contract execution logic of
the base blockchain platform with the capability of executing actions that depend on the
extended blockchain services or smart hub interface layers and cannot be directly han-
dled at a lower level. This execution logic will be embedded in the blockchain platform as
to call procedures from the extended signing policies provider for signing and verifying
transactions whose contract requires some decentralized and fault-tolerant transaction
endorsement scheme, to require a transaction to be executed over the BFT consensus
service, or to contact some sort of external service that does not readily exist within the
decentralized ledgering system.
Broker Mechanism. When a new entity joins the system, a user, a smart hub or
another device, it is assigned to a predetermined set of brokers (in the base model this
will only occur with the smart hub). These nodes can be seen as bootstrap nodes on
the blockchain network, as they are the nodes that will initially respond to the external
entities requests and act on their behalf. Note that this does not restrict the joining entity
to communicating only to these nodes. Service providers can also have their own brokers,
which are likely to be their own servers, to represent themselves within the system, from
which they manage their presence on the service and their contracts. We assume, for a
simplified approach, that the entity joining the service has a set of pre-exchanged public-
keys and any other cryptographic material with the brokers (e.g. by configuration) in
order to be able to communicate with them in a secure fashion. A more complex scenario
could be implemented through a dynamic discovery mechanism where an entity polls
its known brokers for additional brokers to communicate with. While this mechanism is
conceptually located at the extended blockchain services layer, in practice it is expected
to be implemented in part by the base blockchain services, for accepting external entities
communications in a client-server architecture and for maintaining a record of which
entities do they represent, and in other part by the entities themselves, which will have to
perform requests to blockchain server nodes and interact with bootstrap broker nodes and
use them to find any other needed peer nodes in the blockchain network. One thing to
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note is that if the base blockchain platform does not execute global ledger replication, each
broker will need to be identified as a representative proxy for a given external entity as to
replicate any needed data to that external entity on its brokers. This broker mechanism,
which links an entity to a set of nodes, together with the internal identification of nodes
already supported by the base blockchain platform, ensures R5.
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Consensus. As described in Section 2.4, some blockchain
platforms using consortium-based consensus operate under the premise of supporting
crash fault-tolerant behaviour only. While there is in fact a certain number of platforms
that provide Byzantine fault-tolerance, this is not always the case. We intend for our
platform to endure any malicious or faulty behaviour to its consensus mechanism that
may corrupt how nodes view the replicated information on the ledger.
The component described here is essentially an extension of existing consensus mech-
anisms in the base blockchain services layer that may provide only crash fault-tolerance
guarantees. It will be based on a PBFT state machine replication algorithm [15] and
will be responsible for receiving proposed transactions from blockchain nodes, grouping
them into a single unique block to inserted into the blockchain, and distributing this set
of ordered information back to the nodes for them to append to their local ledger. Our
intended architecture for this consensus service is further described in the next section.
Extended Signing Policies Provider. Every node and broker on the blockchain net-
work will leverage some type of signature scheme for the purpose of endorsing trans-
actions. In general, transaction signing and validation flows within blockchain systems
employ some variation of multi-signature schemes. We intend to override this basic pol-
icy for enabling other schemes that further enable decentralized trust and fault-tolerance
over standard blockchain transaction flows. By doing so, we increase robustness by al-
lowing transactions to be signed by multiple entities in a fault-tolerant fashion, while
retaining the ability to compare several signature schemes regarding performance and
robustness. Accordingly, this component’s objective is to supply the blockchain platform
with a set of primitives and software libraries for using multiple transaction signing and
verification schemes (or policies).
Our system model shall harness the following policies, while allowing for the extensi-
bility of adding new ones:
• Multi-signatures: Standard signing and verification policy we assume to be present
in the base blockchain services layer, where a multitude of nodes sign a single trans-
action and a transaction is committed along with a given set of signatures, each one
uniquely representing a single node and verifiable by the public-key correspond-
ing to that node. Generally, blockchain platforms resort either to RSA or ECDSA
signature schemes.
• Threshold signatures: Signing policy added by our extended signing policies provider
component, based on the threshold signature schemes described in Section 2.5,
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where nodes share a group public-key and sign using shares of a private key. The
result is a single signature and a single public-key to verify that same signature. We
intend to focus on RSA threshold signature schemes.
3.4.3 BFT Middleware for Decentralized Transaction Flows
BFT Consensus for Blockchains. We propose a model for harnessing a consortium off-
chain consensus service that is tolerant to Byzantine behaviour and can be applied to
permissioned blockchain transaction flows. We deviate from fully decentralized consen-
sus algorithms that rely on proof-of-work, as these are computationally costly and exert
strong latency conditions upon transaction confirmation, and upgrade upon fail-stop
consortium models that assume no faults shall occur that do not fall within the spectrum
of system crashes.
PBFT [15] and Tendermint [71] are two examples that have been harnessed for block-
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Figure 3.5: BFT consensus service and ledger block publishing
To achieve such a model, we impose a few requirements on the BFT consensus service.
First, the underlying SMR protocol has to ensure atomic broadcast and hold the consen-
sus properties of safety and liveness in an asynchronous environment, requiring 3f + 1
replicas to be able to tolerate f faults. Secondly, after reaching agreement on the total
order of received transactions, the service shall maintain a reference to the last verified
published block of the ledger, collect all received transactions up to a given limit of maxi-
mum block size or maximum transactions to aggregate in a single block, and produce a
new block with the transactions and an hash of the previously published block, digitally
signing it before relaying it across blockchain peers. Peers receiving the new block will
then verify that the signature belongs to a trusted consensus service, check that it is in fact
the next block in the ledger sequence, and verify transactions one-by-one: i) by checking
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the appended peer signatures of each transaction; and then ii) by executing the transac-
tion payload against a smart contract engine. If every validation succeeds, the block is
appended to ledger. If a validation fails, either a single transaction or the whole block
may be discarded and peers await for the next block. Figure 3.5 outlines this process.
Threshold Cryptography for Decentralizing Blockchain Transactions. As men-
tioned before, we intend to complement transaction signature and verification processes
with threshold cryptography. Such a scheme can prove itself quite useful for remov-
ing single points of failure in standard signature processes, in which a single signature
belongs to a single peer, and in which a failure to sign a transaction by a single peer,
independently of how many signatures may have already been collected, may result in
forfeiting the transaction. To accomplish this, we have to define a framework on which
a blockchain architecture can base itself to benefit from a threshold signature scheme.
We will describe this framework in a manner similar to Stathakopoulou and Cachin [69],
as their approach to explaining this is quite clear, but some of these concepts have been
defined and scrutinized in the past and are commonly known in the field. Let us first
define the method stub of what we expect from such library:
• <GroupKey, KeyShare[]> deal(n, k, mod): Takes the number of participants n,
the minimum quorum size k and the RSA key modulus size mod as input in order
to generate all needed cryptographic material to be used for an RSA threshold
signature scheme, namely: the public group key to verify a threshold signature
against, and an array of key shares, each private to a single peer;
• SignatureShare sign(m, ks): Given a private key share ks and a message m, pro-
duces a signature share over m;
• boolean verify(m, sigs, gk, k): Given a message m, a set of signature shares
sigs and a group key gk, verifies the validity of the signature over m against the
respective public group key. Internally, it assembles a composite signature from the
given signature shares and the minimum quorum size k. Depending on the imple-
mentation it may also internally verify the validity of signature shares individually.
The verify method fails if the threshold of valid signature shares is not met or if the
composite signature itself is not valid.
Given this method stub, it is clear that nodes on the blockchain will resort to the
methods sign and verify for the transaction flows within the blockchain through the
extended signing policies provider. As method deal outputs the complete set of private
key shares to be used by participants in the blockchain network, it is also clear that this
scheme requires a trusted dealer to execute this method and securely distribute key shares
between peers. For a network that is inherently dynamic, where existing nodes can leave
and new nodes can join, such a method would be successively invoked and cryptographic
material continuously distributed by a dealer, in order to keep peers updated with their
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respective key shares and group key. As discussed in our related work, an interactive
key generation scheme could also be achieved, but it would require a higher overhead
for blockchain nodes whenever the network topology changed. We do not discard this
approach, but we leave it for future work if one wishes to study such a scheme.
The signature verification algorithm, triggered by invoking verify is perhaps the
most important method we have to address here in terms of computational cost. Thresh-
old signatures are costly to verify, and any robust threshold signature must tolerate the
presence of f corrupted signature shares as long as the total set of signature shares n
is superior in number to the threshold k. In other words, a signature has to validate if
f ≤ n − k. Accordingly, threshold signature verification algorithms can be classified ac-
cording to the expectancy of corrupted signature shares fed to them and to their expected
computational cost, in pessimistic and optimistic variants of the algorithm, Algorithms 1
and 2, respectively. The notion of the algorithm being pessimistic or optimistic refers to
the task of assembling signature shares into a single signature to be verified against the
public group key.
Assume that to support these algorithms, four internal auxiliary methods exist: build-
Signature whose purpose is to create a composite signature when fed a set of signature
shares, nextCombination that is able generate a combination of signature shares of size
k given a set of size n ≥ k, verifySignatureShare which may be used to verify an indi-
vidual signature share, and verifyCompositeSignature which verifies a signature over
a given message similarly to the traditional RSA verification algorithm. Further assume
that nextCombination behaves in a static way and that each call to this function will
always generate a single combination in a correct sequence.
Algorithm 1 Pessimistic Threshold Signature Verification
1: function verifyPessimistic(m, sigs, gk, k)
2: valid← []
3: i← 0
4: for s← sigs do
5: if verifySignatureShare(s) then
6: valid[i]← s
7: i← i + 1
8: if len(valid) ≥ k then
9: compositeSig← buildSignature(valid)
10: return verifyCompositeSignature(compositeSig,m,gk)
11: return f alse
The pessimistic approach assumes that in a given set of signature shares, some of them
are corrupted, and thus verifies each and every one of them until it reaches k signature
shares needed to verify a composite signature, discarding corrupted ones. Naturally, this
has a heavy cost in the execution time of the verification function.
The optimistic approach, on the other hand, assumes that the first combination of k
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Algorithm 2 Optimistic Threshold Signature Verification




5: if len(c) > 0 then
6: compositeSig← buildSignature(c)
7: return verifyCompositeSignature(compositeSig,m,gk)
8: until len(c) = 0
9: return f alse
signature shares it retrieves are valid and proceeds to verify them immediately. If verifi-
cation fails, the algorithm will then retrace its steps back to generate a new combination
and repeat the process, until a valid signature is found or all combinations are exhausted,
failing the verification.
These threshold signature verification algorithms are in the category of synchronous
algorithms, but they can be made asynchronous with the introduction of a communication
channel into their execution. We expect that any of these schemes may be leveraged in a
implementation basing itself on our system model.
3.5 Threat Model Considerations
The design of our solution takes some considerations for the definition of a subjacent
threat model that we point out here.
External intrusion. Our threat model is focused in the design of the blockchain-based
support and middleware provided services in our platform. The external client-side usage
of the platform is considered as a trustable environment. Our platform must operate un-
der the assumption that malicious adversaries may want to corrupt the history or logging
of verifiable transactions, revert or compromise the process of transaction validation or
even compromise data sharing and related logging operations. The back-end blockchain
support must be able to avoid this by applying the necessary security guarantees and
countermeasures, defending from intrusions that will try to induce such corruptions
and incorrect operation. The counter-measures will be imposed by the Byzantine fault-
tolerance guarantees of the inherently provided consensus protocol primitives.
Internal attacks. In fact, most blockchains operate under the premise that they will
be attacked not only by outside adversaries but also by authorized users executing oper-
ations under possible malicious or incorrect behaviours. The expected threats and the
degree of trust that the network has in the participating nodes in the global blockchain de-
termine the type of the required consensus algorithms that they use to settle their ledger.
As in other existent blockchain platforms, we take as reference a threat model considering
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a very high degree of possible threats, that leads to the need of strong consensus mech-
anisms based on BFT assumptions and leveraged by intrusion-tolerant state-machine
replicated processing. However we assume that the adversary never compromises the
minimum number of correct nodes required to support the safety and liveness conditions
of the required BFT consensus protocol. In this we include the provisioning of the base
properties of strong consensus guarantees at each node level running and endpoint of
the consensus protocol in our blockchain-based platform, namely; validity, agreement,
integrity and termination [18].
Exploit of communication channels. We consider that the network (supporting the
interactions between users and nodes) can be controlled by potential adversaries, start-
ing by defining in the adversary model all the identified threats against user-to-node or
node-to-node communications, as stated in the attack typology and reference of the OSI
X.800 Security Framework 2. Thus, our interactions have to be supported by a trustable
establishment of user-to-node and node-to-node secure channels, guaranteed by mutually
authenticated handshakes and TLS 1.3 support, enhanced by the possible complemen-
tary verification of resilient threshold digital signatures of all operations related to the
verification of smart-contract rules and blockchain transactions.
Trust computing base. Considering the system model and architecture, we consider
that processing capabilities installed on the edge and intermediated by local smart-hubs
are in the trust computing base. Thus, we consider in our design principles that the in-
termediary smart hubs are trusted (including by local hardware, firmware and software),
and the specific applications running in user-controlled computing devices are also con-
sidered in the trust computing base. We do not consider attacks against the availability
of computational and communicational resources, namely those frameworked as DoS
or DDoS attacks typology. We also do not consider in our primary assumptions rout-
ing attacks in the peer-to-peer intercommunication environment, namely attacks such
as: blackholes, sinkholes, wormholes or sybil attacks causing the loss or exhaustion of
processing and communication capabilities.
3.6 Runtime Behaviour
We will now proceed to describe the planned runtime behaviour of our system and its
components in two types of operations: i) a write operation that always involves propos-
ing a transaction to the blockchain; and ii) a read operation, that simply reads whatever
is on the ledger, depending on what was specified on a smart contract for its execution.
These two operations are the basis for every other operation over the blockchain (even
operations for obtaining a contract from the blockchain or for signing it). We will re-
strict ourselves to the base model of interaction, as the extended model can be inferred




from this one (as it would simply require for edge devices to implement a similar set of
components to that of a smart hub in order to communicate with blockchain nodes).
Proposing a transaction. Figure 3.6 illustrates a flow diagram of the execution of the
write protocol. Consider this execution to be done after a user has already accepted a
given service provider contract.
1. The user, using his smartphone, initiates a transaction with a nearby smart hub for
a given service, referring to a smart contract existing in the blockchain by its ID;
2. The hub receives the transaction via its API and forwards it to the application
contract interpreter which will validate the specified contract’s properties to be used
for the remainder of the execution of the transaction. In this case, the interpreter
has the contract cached in local persistency. If that was not the case, it would have
to fetch it from the blockchain by means of a read operation to its broker nodes;
3. After the contract properties are read, the transaction is passed on to the dispatcher,
which will orchestrate the transaction execution over the blockchain peer nodes;
4. The dispatcher invokes the low-level API of the blockchain platform, proposing the
transaction and requesting blockchain nodes to verify it and sign it. The nodes to
propose to, which are the signing (or witness) nodes, are specified on the contract;
5-8. The nodes validate the transaction by executing it on the specified contract over the
extended smart contract engine. This engine is designed to execute dynamically
according to the contract properties;
9-11. After successful validation of the contract, nodes proceed to sign it, using the policy
described on the contract. If the contract specified a different type of transaction
signing policy than the supported default policy by the base blockchain platform,
peer nodes request a special provider component to sign the transaction for them;
12-13. If nodes correctly verify the transaction, they reply to the hub, which collects the
signatures at the dispatcher component. Receiving the set of signatures from reply-
ing peers, the hub proceeds to verify them according to the signing policy specified
on the contract;
14. After enough signatures are collected and validated, the hub sends the transaction
to the consensus service;
15. Consensus is reached and the consensus service propagates the transaction to every
peer, including passive peers who did not witness the transaction proposal;
16-19. The transaction signatures are verified by the receiving peers and if everything
checks out, the result of executing the transaction on the contract, using the smart
contract engine and any needed extended logic, is committed to the ledger;
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Figure 3.6: Flow diagram of a transaction proposal (write operation)
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20-21. The result returned to the hub is forwarded to the user via API. In this context, an
IoT device could read the result of the transaction executed by the user by either
polling the hub or by receiving an event from the API.
Reading from the ledger. Figure 3.7 illustrates a flow diagram of the execution of the
read protocol. The same conditions from the write operation apply here, i.e. assume the
contract over which the read operation is to be executed was accepted beforehand by the
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Figure 3.7: Flow diagram of a query over the ledger (read operation)
1. An IoT device queries the nearby hub it is linked to for some data, supplying a
contract ID;
2. The smart hub, upon receiving the request, calls the applicational contract inter-
preter to verify any needed conditions to be ensured in order to successfully execute
the read operation;
3. The contract interpreter reads the contract and checks whether it has any cached
response for this request. If it does, it responds directly to the IoT device, else it
passes any needed information about the contract to the dispatcher;
4. The dispatcher requests a read operation to the blockchain through the low-level
API of a hub’s broker node. In special cases, depending on the conditions of the
contract, it may perform the same request to other nodes, whether they were a
broker/bootstrap node for this device or not. For simplicity, let us assume the
general scenario is just to query the broker;
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5-7. The transaction manager receives the request and executes the read operation spec-
ified on the contract, which may invoke any needed extended execution logic to be
concluded;
8-9. The contract reads data from the ledger and returns it to the transaction manager;
10-12. The read data is forwarded to the hub, and finally, returned to the IoT device.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented our system model definition and architecture for a decen-
tralized ledgering platform, regarded as a blockchain-enabled IoT platform, that is both
reliable, scalable and independently auditable by any of the participating entities present
at present at typical IoT environments: the users of a given service, the service provider,
things and smart hubs. We present a model in which communication between these
entities, in the form of transactions to a ledger, is mediated by a network built upon
blockchain principles enriched with strong cryptographic controls for digital signatures
that allow for robust decentralized trust and with a dynamically executing transaction
flow regulated by extended smart contracts. This notion of extended smart contracts is a
powerful one that allows regular blockchain contracts to be enhanced with the capability
of changing how system-level properties of the blockchain are executed and allows them
to be interpreted not only at blockchain-level, but also at application-level of software
running on the participating entities.
We also define how smart hubs, either user-owned or service provider-owned, can be
harnessed in conjunction with this ledgering platform to provide a scalable architecture
capable of performing computations, aggregating things and users on the edge, inter-
preting and caching extended smart contracts and acting as representative proxies for
resource-limited IoT devices. Thus, we believe this model follows the motto of this thesis
– to bring order into things – in the sense that IoT environments can be structured into a
more hierarchical topology, with a ledgering platform allowing for decentralized trust
and regulating communication between all participating entities, rather than in peer-flat
chaotic local networks where every device can talk to the next, while also mitigating
the future scalability issues of today’s cloud-first applications by employing aggregation
on the edge with smart hubs and dispersing the blockchain network heterogeneously
throughout cloud providers.
Considering the contents of this chapter, we then go through the discussion of the
implementation of the discussed system model and software architecture, in addressing











In this chapter we present the implementation details related to the prototyping effort of
the system model discussed in Chapter 3. We start from the implementation overview,
describing the technologies used, and then we present the software components and
implementation options taken to build the software architecture of the prototype. An im-
portant consideration to bear in mind is that the prototype implements the base model of
interaction of our system model, to conduct the experimental validation and assessment
to be presented in the next chapter.
4.1 Prototype Overview and Technologies
Prototype Overview. As to provide a general overview of the implemented prototype, we
can describe its composition by the following different software services and components:
• Blockchain-enabled services, leveraged and extended from the base Hyperledger
Fabric (or HLF) components and modules, where the support for threshold and
group multi-signatures, integrated with extended consensus plane services for Byzan-
tine fault-tolerant properties are a relevant touchstone;
• The materialization of the smart hub component, focusing on its base assumptions
for the intermediation of interactions from users and IoT devices (regarded as clients
of the provided services in the blockchain-enabled architecture), and forwarding
those operations as transactions with data-management functions enabled by the
backed blockchain services;
• The implementation of a set of test and benchmarking tools, and demonstrative
client implementations, for system validation, assessment and experimental obser-
vations.
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Technologies. As stated before, for the base blockchain services layer of our prototype we
chose to use the HLF blockchain platform, following the arguments discussed in Chapter
2. The HLF platform and its transaction flow mechanisms meet our system model, albeit
some minor variations, offering an extensible leverageable base for our developments.
The prototype’s blockchain services were built using version 1.1 of Hyperledger Fabric.
The source-code of the platform itself is written in Golang 1.10, as are smart contracts
definitions within the platform. As such, to implement our own custom smart contracts
to be used within the platform and to modify the platform to our needs, we resorted to
Golang as well. On some components of the platform, such as its consensus mechanism
and digital signature components, the technology shifted to JAVA 9, with local communi-
cation between Golang processes and JAVA processes assured by UNIX domain sockets.
Communications and messages exchanged with and within the HLF are done via gRPC1
with Google’s protobuf serialization2. Thus, when needed, we had to configure these and
modify properties of the exchanged messages through parameterized Protocol Buffers.
The deployment of the blockchain platform was done by running a set of Docker
containers, using Docker CE 18.03 and Docker Compose 2. Using Docker technology, we
virtualize the blockchain network on a single machine, with each Docker container hold-
ing a blockchain peer process, allowing different containers to have different roles within
the network. This platform can be deployed on a physically distributed environment,
but for minimizing deployment overhead and quickly manage changes to the blockchain
infrastructure, we preferred to follow a virtualized approach.
For the smart hub interface layer the technology used was JAVA 9, mostly due to the
capability of writing a smart hub application that could run agnostically to the underlying
hub’s architecture and due to our familiarity with the language. To interact with the HLF
we used the Hyperledger Fabric JAVA SDK 1.13, which we later modified for the needs
of our system model. For local persistency on smart hubs, MongoDB 4.04 was used, as
it is a lightweight key-value store. For exposing the hub in two distinct endpoints, one
for constrained IoT devices and another for more capable devices leveraged by the end
user, we resorted to a CoAP JAVA implementation provided by mbed5, and Spark JAVA
2.7.26, a micro-framework for implementing RESTful applications harnessing a Jetty 9.4
HTTP web server7, respectively. Communication between the hub and devices can be
executed by exchanging messages in JSON format. Users can also interact with the hub in
a web browser and obtain an HTML response. A fork of this layer intended at running a
lightweight SSL library and DTLS [59] was also implemented using WolfSSL8 (written in
1gRPC framework: https://grpc.io/
2Google Protocol Buffers (or protobuf ): https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf
3Hyperledger Fabric JAVA SDK: https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-java
4MongoDB cross-platform document-oriented database: https://www.mongodb.com/mongodb-4.0
5CoAP JAVA implementation by mbed: https://github.com/ARMmbed/java-coap
6Spark JAVA framework: http://sparkjava.com/
7Jetty servlet engine: https://www.eclipse.org/jetty/
8WolfSSL embedded SSL library: https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl
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C) and the JAVA Native Interface (JNI)9. This fork, however, uses a custom binary format
of structured byte arrays instead of JSON for exchanging messages.
Lastly, we also implemented an Android application in JAVA to provide a more realis-
tic setting when interacting with the smart hub and to validate final end-user interactions
via a smartphone. The targeted Android SDK of this application was version 28 and the
minimum SDK was version 15, with the application able to run in Android 4.0.3 (Ice
Cream Sandwich) as minimum requirement.
4.2 Prototype Architecture and Implementation
Mirroring our system model, our prototype implementation can be seen in layers: i) a
Base Blockchain Services layer which we consider to be the HLF and the base services it
provides; ii) an Extended Blockchain Services layer which extends the first layer. This
layer is rather discussed as a conceptual layer, but we will refer to the two blockchain
service layers as the whole extension of blokchain-enabled services, according to our
development and as a new HLF-enhanced substrate; and iii) a Smart Hub Interface layer
which has a direct mapping of the components in our system model. On top of that,
we have got all of the entities required by our base model of interaction: users who
will through some kind of medium (smartphones apps, browsers, or other client-side
applications) interacting with smart hubs, IoT devices (or things), and service providers
managing smart contracts on the blockchain and any nodes that may belong to them via
an administration console or a back-office application. The architecture of the prototype
is illustrated in Figure 4.1, which will accompany the remainder of this chapter.
In terms of implementation effort, the whole codebase of the prototype was imple-
mented in around 5900 lines of code, as Table 4.1 shows. The Smart Hub Interface and the
Android application, which were built from scratch and by integration of the aforemen-
tioned software libraries, resulted in around 2150 and 750 lines of code, respectively. The
addition of components to the HLF and changes to its original codebase totaled around
3000 lines of code.
Component Estimated LoC
Smart Hub Interface 2150
Overall implementation 2100
Changes to the HLF JAVA SDK 50
Blockchain Services 3000
Changes to the HLF platform 1200
Impl. of extended smart contracts 500
Rectifications to HLF BFT-SMaRt impl. 50
Impl. of the extended signing policies provider 1250
Android Application 750
Total 5900
Table 4.1: Prototype implementation extension metrics (LoC)
9JNI bridge for WolfSSL: https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssljni
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Figure 4.1: Prototype architecture
Regarding implementation complexity, developing and testing the prototype required
the use of varied and distinct technologies, programming languages and language para-
digms. Some of the technologies we used are in their infancy and yet to fully stabilize
(e.g. the HLF SDK and APIs), and thus had higher than initially expected learning curves
and unclear documentation. We harnessed multiple communication protocols (HTTP,
gRPC and protobuf, CoAP, UNIX sockets) and were able to integrate such a wide array
of technologies into a functional prototype composed by multiple artifacts. Moreover,
we implemented the smart hub and extended blockchain service components as to be
extensively configurable. The prototype was designed as a tiered architecture between
clients, smart hubs and the blockchain, and fully implements the designed architecture
from end-to-end. To do so, it required knowledge of different concepts: from blockchain
architecture, server-side services, and network communication, to the intermediation of
concurrent client communication through multi-threaded hub middleware, client-server
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models with some level of data caching, and mobile development.
We emphasize two final issues as relevant implementation concerns in addressing
the developed prototype. The first issue is the implementation strategy for reusing the
base HLF system model components to leverage a pluggable model for a BFT consensus
layer that includes the new types of group-oriented validation signatures; the second
issue is the mapping strategy for smart contracts in the implemented prototype, using
HLF Chaincode10. A Chaincode is triggered when a transaction is proposed and decides
the state changes to be applied to the ledger. Thus, we must deal with initialization and
management of ledger states by the received transactions, according to the new verifica-
tion conditions, when group oriented multi-signatures or reliable threshold signatures
are used, while maintaining the base assumptions of HLF, where Chaincodes can run in
different containers from the peer and the state that is generated by a Chaincode is not
accessible by another Chaincode, this way being able to maintain isolation guarantees.
4.2.1 Blockchain Services
To start explaining our implementation for the blockchain services layer we first have
to give a brief description of the chosen platform: Hyperledger Fabric. We have already
introduced the platform generically in Subsection 2.4.4, but for an easier comprehension
we will provide a short summarized description of the platform relevant for explaining
our implementation.
Base Blockchain Platform. The HLF is a platform which comes along with a few
specific abstractions and concepts. Fabric is in essence, a permissioned consortium-based
platform, whose consensus service relies on an off-chain model with fail-stop guarantees
at most, i.e. it does not tolerate Byzantine behaviour. It is organization-oriented, which
means that every node on the blockchain has a membership relationship with a single
organization. Access control on the network is done by means of trust between organiza-
tions (through their respective certificates). Also, it uses the notion of channels, which
can be viewed as partitions in a partial blockchain ledger replication scheme, i.e. trans-
actions and contracts are only visible to an entity in the scope of a channel, if they have
access rights to it. Within a single channel and a contract deployed on that channel, the
HLF defines what is known as an endorsement policy, which is a set of rules composed
by logical and-gates and or-gates where an administrator can specify the organizations
that should sign transactions for that specific contract. Entities in HLF can be categorized
into the following roles:
• Peers: Nodes responsible for maintaining a valid ledger of transactions and execut-
ing Chaincode logic. They are further divided into Endorser and Committer roles.
As Endorsers, nodes endorse a given transaction by signing it after successfully
executing it over a given chaincode without committing its results to the ledger
10HLF denotes its implementation of smart contracts as Chaincode, as referred in Subsection 2.4.4.
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(imagine it as a simulation), while as Committers, nodes verify the integrity of the
transaction and its appended signatures, and if successful, commit it to the ledger;
• Orderers: Nodes responsible for publishing blocks of transactions to Peers for them
to be appended to the blockchain. To do so, these nodes resort to an Ordering Ser-
vice to establish consensus on the order of transactions they receive from incoming
messages.
• Ordering Service nodes: Nodes responsible for establishing consensus on the total
history of transactions that occurred within the system. The only officially sup-
ported implementation for the HLF is an Apache Kafka and Zookeeper ensemble, a
model which only provides crash fault-tolerant guarantees.
• Clients: Applications external to the blockchain which communicate with Peers and
Orderers via the HLF SDK (e.g. our smart hub implementation).
Transaction flow for write operations, or invocations, within the HLF usually starts
with a client application proposing a transaction to a set of Peers assuming the Endorser
role. These nodes simulate the transaction proposal, endorse it if no invalid state occurs
and return the signed proposal back to the client. The client can verify the signatures and
the consistency of the responses and send the set of signed transactions to Orderer nodes.
The Orderer delegates consensus to an Ordering Service and on its callback, compiles a
result of ordered transactions into a single block. This block is then broadcasted across
the network, where nodes, now acting as Commiters, verify the signatures of Endorsers,
Orderers and the client, as well as the integrity of the payload. If successful, the block
is then appended/committed to the ledger of each Peer. For read operations, or queries,
what happens is that a client requests a query over the ledger to its known Peers, which
then sign the response and return it to the client.
BFT Consensus Service. For this component, which is a part of our Extended Block-
chain Services layer, we used the implementation by Sousa et al. [6, 7], which was, at
the time of writing this document, a yet unofficial consensus service for the HLF. The
service itself is implemented using BFT-SMaRt, a PBFT-like consensus mechanism, and
is modeled so that HLF’s orderer nodes possess a secondary process which allows them
to proxy communication to a known set of BFT-SMaRt replicas. The communication
between these two processes, the main orderer process and the proxy process, is assured
in local memory by UNIX domain sockets.
The scope of the authors of the BFT-SMaRt implementation for the HLF was to create
a consensus module that was functionally correct, robust and efficient. However, for the
purpose of our implementation, we had to rectify and make some adaptations to the ex-
isting codebase as to allow multiple organization memberships to submit transactions to
the consensus replicas as we need multiple organizations to have more than one signature
per transaction. We also had to dockerize the two orderer processes within a single Docker
image and create a set of bash scripts to allow configurability.
62
4.2. PROTOTYPE ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
Extended Smart Contract. For the purpose of our prototype we implemented a con-
tract which follows the Extended Smart Contract specification of our system model. We
refer to this contract as XCC. The XCC was designed to be a generic smart contract with
no specific business need in mind. As such, it only stores records in the form of a key-
value store within the blockchain ledger. However, the more important part of the XCC
is its ability to influence blockchain transaction flow and to be interpreted, albeit in a
distinct representation and format, outside the blockchain.
Listing 4.1 is an excerpt of our XCC implementation that shows how properties of
different sections of the contract – extended contract properties and application-specific
properties – are structured and stored within the contract.
Listing 4.1: Excerpt of the XCC chaincode properties and functions
1 . . .
2 / / Contrac t ex t ended p r o p e r t i e s
3 type ExtendedContractPropert ies s t r u c t {
4 ContractId s t r i n g ‘ j son : " contract − id " ‘
5 ContractVersion int ‘ j son : " contract −vers ion " ‘
6 Avai lableFunct ions [ ] [ ] s t r i n g ‘ j son : " a v a i l a b l e − funct ions " ‘
7 InstalledOnNodes [ ] s t r i n g ‘ j son : " i n s t a l l e d −on−nodes " ‘
8 SignatureType s t r i n g ‘ j son : " s ignature −type " ‘ / / m u l t i s i g , t h r e s h s i g
9 SigningNodes [ ] Node ‘ j son : " signing −nodes " ‘
10 ConsensusType s t r i n g ‘ j son : " consensus−type " ‘ / / b f t , f a i l s t o p
11 ConsensusNodes [ ] Node ‘ j son : " consensus−nodes " ‘
12 ExpiresOn s t r i n g ‘ j son : " expires −on " ‘
13 ValidFrom s t r i n g ‘ j son : " val id −from " ‘
14 ProviderSignature s t r i n g ‘ j son : " provider −s ignature " ‘
15 DeployedOn s t r i n g ‘ j son : " deployed−on " ‘
16 }
17
18 / / Contrac t a p p l i c a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s
19 type A p p l i c a t i o n S p e c i f i c P r o p e r t i e s s t r u c t {
20 MaxRecords int ‘ j son : " max−records " ‘
21 TotalRecords int ‘ j son : " t o t a l −records " ‘
22 / / . . . f o r example p u r p o s e s only
23 }
24
25 / / Records h e l d on t h e l e d g e r , i . e . a c t u a l data
26 type Record s t r u c t {
27 Data s t r i n g ‘ j son : " data " ‘
28 }
29
30 func ( s * SmartContract ) I n i t ( APIstub shim . ChaincodeStubInterface ) sc . Response {
31 args := APIstub . GetStringArgs ( )
32 . . .
33 / / Unmarshall a r g s
34 var extProps ExtendedContractPropert ies
35 var appProps A p p l i c a t i o n S p e c i f i c P r o p e r t i e s
36 e r r := j son . Unmarshal ( [ ] byte ( args [ 0 ] ) , &extProps )
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37 i f e r r != n i l {
38 return shim . Error ( e r r . Error ( ) )
39 }
40 e r r = json . Unmarshal ( [ ] byte ( args [ 1 ] ) , &appProps )
41 . . .
42
43 / / Save c o n t r a c t p r o p e r t i e s on t h e b l o c k c h a i n
44 extPropsCompositeKey , _ := APIstub . CreateCompositeKey ( " props " ,
45 [ ] s t r i n g { "EXTENDED_CONTRACT_PROPERTIES" } )
46 extPropsAsBytes , _ := j son . Marshal ( extProps )
47 APIstub . PutState ( extPropsCompositeKey , extPropsAsBytes )
48 appPropsCompositeKey , _ := APIstub . CreateCompositeKey ( " props " ,
49 [ ] s t r i n g { "APPLICATION_SPECIFIC_PROPERTIES" } )
50 appPropsAsBytes , _ := j son . Marshal ( appProps )
51 APIstub . PutState ( appPropsCompositeKey , appPropsAsBytes )
52
53 return shim . Success ( n i l )
54 }
55
56 func ( s * SmartContract ) Invoke ( APIstub shim . ChaincodeStubInterface ) sc . Response
57 {
58 / / R e t r i e v e t h e r e q u e s t e d Smart Contrac t f u n c t i o n and arguments
59 function , args := APIstub . GetFunctionAndParameters ( )
60 / / Route t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e hand l e r f u n c t i o n t o i n t e r a c t with t h e l e d g e r
61 / / a p p r o p r i a t e l y
62 i f funct ion == " ge tContrac tDef in i t ion " {
63 return s . ge tContrac tDef in i t ion ( APIstub )
64 } e l s e i f funct ion == " s ignContract " {
65 return s . s ignContract ( APIstub , args )
66 } e l s e i f funct ion == " getContractS ignature " {
67 return s . getContractS ignature ( APIstub , args )
68 } e l s e i f funct ion == " getEndorsementMethod " {
69 return s . getEndorsementMethod ( APIstub )
70 } e l s e {
71 . . .
72 }
73 . . .
System-level properties, the ones used by the blockchain platform, are not specified
here as those are internal meta-data of the HLF. The properties stored directly on the
contract are exportable in a JSON representation to the outside world (e.g. to the smart
hub) and are populated when the contract is deployed to the blockchain by a service
provider. In our prototype this is done via console commands by an HLF user with
administration rights. The deployment of the contract consists of its installation on peers
and then its instantiation, which results in a a call to the Init function seen below –
the function that registers the contracts properties. The Invoke function, on the other
hand, is the function executed when a query or an invoke operation is triggered over the
contract. This function identifies the sub-routine it has to execute in order to fulfill the
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call, reading or writing on the ledger.
Transaction Signing and Verification. We overrode two system chaincodes, the ESCC
(Endorsement System Chaincode) and the VSCC (Verification System Chaincode). Sys-
tem chaincodes are a special type of contracts within the HLF that execute in their own
dedicated environments (or containers) designed for executing system-level operations.
Imagine them as a kernel functions of the blockchain. In this case, the ESCC is the
chaincode responsible for endorsing transactions, i.e. signing them with a cryptographic
algorithm, and the VSCC is responsible for verifying the integrity of the transaction and
any signatures created by the ESCC.
Our changes to the ESCC and the VSCC were done in the scope of allowing the HLF
to dynamically decide on what signature method to use to sign transactions over a given
contract by querying the properties of that same contract. Logically, there is a property in
the contract that defines the signature method to use. In our prototype, possible methods
are: i) multi-signatures (the default HLF implementation); ii) and threshold signatures.
The latter is provided by a module we developed called the Extended Signing Policies
Provider (XSPP), which is an optional multi-threaded secondary process (in JAVA) run-
ning in the containers of Peer nodes, together with their main process (in Golang). We
say optional, because this approach allows a modular implementation; nodes that do not
need to endorse transactions will probably not need to boot the XSPP. Communication
between these two processes is done via UNIX domain sockets, similarly to the aforemen-
tioned BFT-SMaRt service, in TCP streams. Each new connection to the XSPP will be
attended by a thread from a fixed but configurable thread-pool in the XSPP. The reason
for the existence of this module as a separated component from the HLF main process
is, first, because it allows for further extensibility, i.e. in the future, new policies and
signature schemes other than threshold signatures can be added to this module without
having to disrupt the codebase of the HLF Peer node, and second, because Golang has
a lack of cryptographic primitives support for threshold signatures (possibly due to the
recency of the language), namely for Shoup’s threshold signature scheme [67], which is
the one we intended to implement.
The implemented signing and verification processes of the prototype can visualized in
Figure 4.2. The original signing processes consisted of the signing node simply executing
a given operation over a specific chaincode and then signing it with its organization
signature. If the client sent transactions to multiple Endorsers, the result would be a
multi-signature scheme. Regarding verification, the process was similar, verification of
signatures was done using the multi-signature scheme by default before an integrity
validation of the transaction against the contract. In our implementation, a different
protocol occurs.
For signing transactions (top diagram), the implemented process is as follows:
1-2. After an Endorser receives a transaction proposal from a client, it verifies the trans-
action against the contract, which runs in an isolated chaincode environment (or
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Figure 4.2: Signing (top) and verification (bottom) of transactions
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container);
3. After a successful contract validation, the node requests the ESCC to sign the trans-
action;
4-5. The ESCC queries the properties of the contract in a chaincode-to-chaincode invo-
cation;
Note: Querying the signature method and properties from the contract is slow, requiring
a heavy number of internal validations and calls, and is done only for the first trans-
action over the contract. The ESCC keeps record of the signature method for posterior
transactions;
6. If multi-signature is the method specified on the contract, the ESCC uses the default
signing mechanism. If not, it requests the XSPP to sign the transaction instead.
7. The signed transaction is returned to the node, which registers the signing method
on the transaction payload, and is sent back to the client.
For verifying transactions and consequently committing data to the ledger (bottom
diagram), the implemented process is as follows:
1. After a Committer receives a transactions block from an Orderer, it requests the
VSCC to verify the appended signatures, which it does by reading the signature
method property on the payload of the transactions to understand which method
of signature verification it should use;
1. If the VSCC identifies that the method used to sign the transactions was a multi-
signatures scheme, it uses the default signature verification scheme. Otherwise, it
requests the XSPP to verify the signatures instead;
3-4. After successful signature validation, the transactions are verified against a given
contract;
5-6. Upon a successful contract validation, the Commiter records the transaction block
and its signatures to its local ledger;
XSPP Implementation Details. The XSPP implemented on our prototype, albeit its
extensibility, harnesses only a threshold signature library at its latest version. The library
integrated into the solution was the one in [73]. Outputs and inputs of the library were
originally defined in a numeric format, i.e. group keys, private key shares and signature
shares were all defined by the mathematical notations of RSA cryptographic materials (e.g.
64-bit integers for exponents). We defined a custom serialization format for these objects
where we build a byte array structured into different fields, each one for each parameter of
the object, and then converting the whole array into a base-64 representation which could
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be used for communication purposes with peer nodes. For the purpose of our prototype,
we inject key shares and respective group key into peer nodes as environment variables.
The library also had a limitation in which it would require exactly K signature shares
to be fed into its verification function or it would always result in a failure, K being the
minimum quorum size of a threshold signature scheme. We believe that for any L ≥ K ,
the verification function should always be able to validate the transaction assured the
threshold of valid signatures is met, so we implemented an iterative permutation algo-
rithm within the verification function. Essentially, given an L ≥ K to the verification
function, the algorithm generates a permutation of K signature shares and then proceeds
to verify the function. If it fails, it repeats the process for a new permutation. If all
permutation-verification pairs fail, then the threshold signature verification fails perma-
nently. Theoretically, in the best-case and most likely scenario, the complexity of this
approach is just of generating a single permutation and verifying it immediately. In the
case that there are enough Byzantine parties to corrupt the signature, the verification pro-
cess will run through all possible permutations until it actually concludes the signature
was corrupt, resulting in a possible performance degradation in transaction verification.
Thus, going back to our system model, in Subsection 3.4.3, we can classify our threshold
signature verification scheme as optimistic and synchronous, since we verify immediately
the first given k signatures and expect in the best case scenario that there is no corrupted
signature present. It is synchronous as the algorithm itself makes the requester block
while waiting for verification to complete.
4.2.2 Smart Hub
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, our smart hub implementation consists of three major compo-
nents: the API, the Contract Interpreter and the Dispatcher. In effect, these components
were originally outlined and specified for the Smart Hub Interface in our system model,
but all other components of that same layer are present here, even though they might
be represented as a minor part of the smart hub architecture. These three components
can be seen as a sequence of states for requests sent to the hub: requests enter through
the API, where they are routed, verified in terms of correctness of the request (if the
action the request is trying to trigger exists, if all mandatory parameters are supplied,
if a client certificate is supplied when TLS mutual authentication is required, and any
other needed validations), unmarshalled (if any payload exists), and passed on to the
Contract Interpreter. The Contract Interpreter verifies the contents of the request against
a given contract specified by the request and then passes the results of interpreting the
contract’s properties and the contents of the request to the Dispatcher, which orchestrates
all communication with the blockchain services according to the supplied information.
Furthermore, given that current devices close to the notion of a smart hub [2, 3, 61]
are very heterogeneous at both hardware and operating system levels and that the rising
trend of the IoT is only expected to increase, we intended with this implementation
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to provide a smart hub interface which would be able to be executed on most devices
independently of their hardware or OS specifications. However, as this heterogeneity may
lead to different resource capabilities, we intended to develop the hub with as lightweight
components and libraries as reasonably possible. Thus, our choices for the technologies
of the smart hub implementation were heavily influenced by these premises.
URL: https://<address>:<port>/api/<channel>/contract/<contract-id>
Method: GET
Response format: application/json or text/html, depending on an Accept header.
Returns a representation of the contract with identifier equal to <contract-id>, if it exists
within the blockchain and within channel <channel>. It also returns a SHA256 hash of the
contract for users to sign and accept the terms of the contract.
URL: https://<address>:<port>/api/<channel>/contract/<contract-id>/sign
Method: POST
Response format: application/json or text/html, depending on an Accept header.
Requires: A payload with a client signature of the contract.
Allows the user to accept the contract with identifier equal to <contract-id>, if it exists
within the blockchain and within channel <channel>. Returns a confirmation or an error




Response format: For HTTP, application/json or text/html, depending on an Accept
header. For CoAP, only application/json is supported.
Requires: A payload with the function name to query and optional arguments. For CoAP,
<channel> and <contract-id> have to be prepended to the payload.
Allows a query to the service to be executed over the contract with identifier equal to
<contract-id>, if it exists within the blockchain and within channel <channel>, and if the




Response format: For HTTP, application/json or text/html, depending on an Accept
header. For CoAP, only application/json is supported.
Requires: A payload with the function name to invoke and optional arguments. For CoAP,
<channel> and <contract-id> have to be prepended to the payload.
Allows an invocation to the service to be executed over the contract with identifier equal to
<contract-id>, if it exists within the blockchain and within channel <channel>, and if the
supplied function name exists. This invoke operation writes over the ledger by sending a
transaction to the blockchain. Returns a confirmation or an error back to the caller.
* The operation can be called with GET on browsers to get an HTML form for executing the POST method.
Table 4.2: Smart Hub API operations
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API. Our implementation of the smart hub API exports a set of HTTP/CoAP opera-
tions which all map to the stub defined in our system model in Section 3.4. We segment
traffic between these two protocols and expect users, through their smartphones or other
medium, to contact the hub via HTTP, and IoT resource-constricted devices to contact the
hub via CoAP. As such, operations related to obtaining and accepting a smart contract
are only supported via HTTP since these are only relevant for users of the service. Both
HTTP and CoAP servers are multi-threaded while attending requests. All supported oper-
ations are described in detail in Table 4.2, where the fields <address>, <port>, <channel>
and <chaincode> represent the Internet address and port of the smart hub, and the HLF
communication channel where a given smart contract is deployed, respectively.
Contract Interpreter. A local MongoDB instance runs within the smart hub for the
purpose of providing a local smart contract persistency mechanism. This instance keeps
contracts cached on the hub and retrieves them from persistency by their identifier. When
an operation over a specific contract is requested to the Interpreter, there is a first at-
tempt to locate in cache. If unsuccessful, the Interpreter retrieves the contract from the
blockchain and stores it in the local store for future operations, only then proceeding to
extract and validate the contract’s properties. No operation is executed without verifying
the respective contract’s properties at least once.
The Contract Interpreter validates a set of properties on the contract in a fashion that
resembles the validation of X509 certificates. It first identifies if the contract has a given
standardized structure (specified in Subsection 3.4.1), and then proceeds to verify fields
such as the expiry date on the contract, the beginning date, if the contract has clearly
defined the signature method and consensus service endpoints to be used, and so on.
After successful validation, properties such as the nodes that will sign the transaction,
which signature method to use to verify signatures obtained from blockchain nodes are
passed on to the Dispatcher component. This validation is only executed for each contract
per run of the smart hub, for performance reasons.
Dispatcher. The implemented Dispatcher component as a whole has a few functions:
i) it contacts a set of boostrap nodes upon booting up the smart hub in order to get any
requested contracts from a user from them; ii) it initializes and maintains a set of Fabric
channels which the hub is authorized to communicate with; iii) and it triggers query
and invoke requests to peer nodes; the operations of the API, while having additional
complexity added to them, all delegate to these two last functions. This last component of
the smart hub depends heavily on the HLF SDK library, which is responsible for sending
and receiving requests from the HLF network using the gRPCS protocol with protobuf
serialization of messages. The SDK is essentially a multi-threaded client capable of doing
some client-side operation processing, and together with the gRPC interface on each
blockchain node, it implements the brokering mechanism.
As the HLF verifies transaction signatures in two points, one in the blockchain net-
work before committing transactions to the ledger, and another one on client applications
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using the HLF SDK when transaction responses are received from Endorsers, the SDK was
modified by us to support dynamic switching of signature verification schemes according
to the properties of a contract. We implemented a mechanism that verifies a property
on transaction proposal responses set by Endorsers stating the signature method used to
sign that response, so that the SDK can decide which signature verification scheme to use.
For the multi-signature signature scheme, the SDK resorts to the default implementation.
For threshold signatures it resorts to the library in [73] that we integrated for that pur-
pose. After successful verification and checking peer responses for coherence, the SDK
produces an envelope where it also registers the signature method used and sends it to
orderer nodes.
4.2.3 Other Implementation Aspects
Android Client Application. As mentioned before, we implemented a small Android
application for an increased degree of realism while interacting with a smart hub, either
emulated on a computer or running in a dedicated physical device. The application
implementation is quite simple and consists of three screens (or activities in Android
slang): i) a configuration activity for users to input needed parameters to communicate
with the hub (hub address and port, channel, contract name); ii) an activity for visualizing
contract specifications and accepting them; iii) and an activity for executing query and
invoke operations over the hub. All communications with the smart hub, protected with
TLS 1.3 and mutual authentication, result in the application calling the operations in
Table 4.2. For accepting a contract, something which just requires a press of a button
from a user, the Android application employs an automated signing mechanism, using
its private key to sign the hash of the contract, returning it to the hub.
DTLS Smart Hub API. We implemented an alternative API version, which uses a
lightweight WolfSSL library for DTLS [59] communication with external entities, both
users and IoT devices. It exports the same functions as the original implementation, albeit
in a different format. A structured byte array is used to send messages back and forth
between users and things in communication with the hub, where the first section of the
byte array is an integer representing the operation being executed and the second section
is a set of arguments needed for correctly executing the function. This version, however,
was not explored as much as the dual protocol HTTP/CoAP version.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we described the implementation effort related to building a prototype
based on the system model of the previous chapter. We highlighted and went into detail
where needed of the main features of the prototype, namely: the usage of Hyperledger
Fabric as the base blockchain platform, the integration of the BFT-SMaRt consensus ser-
vice into the platform, our implementation of extended smart contracts which can be
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dynamically interpreted at different levels of our model, how that same interpretation
influences transaction and verification processes within our system and how do we in-
tegrate threshold signatures into these processes, our implementation and architecture
for smart hubs and all respective components and other relevant implementation aspects,
such as an Android application used for a more realistic end-to-end testing in a client–
smart-hub–blockchain topology.
The prototype was built upon the base model of interaction where smart hubs inter-
mediate communication of users and things with the blockchain services, it is extensively
configurable, both the smart hub and the blockchain platform, and was written in around
5900 lines of code. Its source-code shall be available in the open-source community11.
A final consideration to bear in mind is that our current prototype implements the
relevant base assumptions in the model of interaction referred in Chapter 3, offering a
pluggable base for other future developments. Given time restrictions, implementing a
more extended model of interaction, namely supporting other IoT edge-based ecosystems
and their protocols, enhanced smart hub functions, and integration of other cryptographic
methods for threshold-based signatures, with expressive definitions for the execution of
smart contracts, would prove itself complex and require a higher amount of work. This
would be difficult to fit within the scope of this thesis. However, we believe that the
modular approach of the implemented prototype offers the possibility to capitalize this
effort, as interesting future work research directions.










Experimental Evaluation and Analysis
In this chapter we describe our experimental assessment effort over the developed pro-
totype described in Chapter 4. First we describe our test-bench environment conditions,
and then we proceed to present our obtained results from evaluating each prototype com-
ponent. We analyze results in detail, relate them to our expectations according to our
system model and related work, and identify open issues where applicable.
In summary, our evaluation criteria, i.e. the questions we answer with the analysis of
the experimental results in this chapter are the following:
• Can we build a blockchain-supported system with Byzantine fault-tolerance guar-
antees and decentralized trustability assumptions with a viable throughput1 and
with a security level on pair with modern security standards?
• Can we further decentralize and increase the robustness of blockchain architectures
by modifying transaction signing and verification processes to be group-oriented
and fault-tolerant while maintaining an acceptable throughput?
• Can different signature schemes for blockchain transactions work better under dif-
ferent parametrization conditions?
• Can we provide a scalable edge-based smart hub architecture for the IoT capable of
reasonable throughput under increasing stress conditions?
• Can we provide a system model where protocol and communication weight on IoT
things, sensors and actuators is minimal?
1By viable throughput in BFT guarantees with decentralized trustability assumptions, what we mean is
that we wish to assess how adding BFT consensus and threshold signatures to Hyperledger Fabric can affect
the practicability of the solution and of the theoretical throughput referred in Section 2.4.
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5.1 Test-bench Environment
The test-bench environment for evaluating our implementation, and consequently our
system model, was set up in the below topology. In terms of technical specifications for
each machine, their characteristics are summarized in Table 5.1.
• A dedicated cloud server for hosting the blockchain services environment, in which
blockchain nodes ran in virtualized Docker networks;
• A single-board Raspberry Pi computer for running the smart hub API and closely
emulating a real-world scenario of a physical smart hub deployment in which it
would be expected to have as less complex hardware as possible;
• A laptop used for emulating the smart hub API as an alternative to the Raspberry
Pi above, in order to assess the smart hub API in optimal resource conditions;
• An HTTP and CoAP client built by us and executing from the laptop above for
benchmarking an end-to-end scenario between clients and the blockchain interme-
diated by smart hubs. In effect, benchmarks from this tool were measured directly
against a single smart hub, either deployed in the same machine (emulated deploy-
ment) as the benchmarking client or on a Raspberry Pi on the LAN;
• A gRPC client – Hyperledger Caliper2 – for benchmarking the blockchain services
network with asynchronous workloads, running on the same laptop as the above
client. This client used a variation of the HLF SDK 1.1.0 to communicate with the
HLF network, a version implemented in node.js;
Dedicated cloud server Benchmark client / Smart hub Smart hub
CPU Intel Xeon D1520 @ 2.2-2.7GHz Intel Core i5-5200U @ 2.2GHz Cortex-A53 @ 1.4GHz
RAM 128Gb DDR4 2133MHz 16Gb DDR3 1600Mhz 1Gb LPDDR2 SDRAM
OS Debian Stretch 9.4 Windows 10 Pro Raspbian Stretch lite 4.14
Model OVH HOST-128L HP EliteBook 840G2 Raspberry Pi 3B+
Table 5.1: Technical specifications of the test-bench environment
We measured memory consumption and CPU usage for the smart hub API by per-
forming real-time monitoring of the application using JConsole, and produced runtime
heap dumps that were then analyzed using Eclipse MAT3.
The hardware components in this topology at the edge, i.e. our testing local laptop
and the Raspberry Pi, were linked by a single switch in a dedicated network environ-
ment as to reduce interference between network traffic of communications related to our
system with traffic produced by other applications, which could negatively impact the
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an ISP-provided switch via Ethernet with a measured connection of 100 Mbps. WLAN
was measured at around 10 Mbps. HTTP and CoAP requests between the smart hub
benchmarking client and the Raspberry Pi were executed over WLAN, while communi-
cation between the Pi and the dedicated cloud server were executed over Ethernet links,
as the Pi was directly connected via Ethernet to the dedicated switch. The HTTP con-
nection between the benchmarking client and the smart hub API was protected by TLS
with mutual authentication. Benchmarking the blockchain platform with Hyperledger
Caliper was performed via Ethernet. At a virtual network level of the dedicated cloud
server, the Docker network supporting the blockchain platform was segmented into two
distinct virtual subnets: one for consensus nodes (BFT-SMaRt replicas, Apache Kafka and
Zookeeper instances), and another one for regular blockchain nodes (peers and orderers).
In terms of network latency between the test hardware, the measured ICMP ping RTT
latency from the benchmarking client running on our test laptop and the Raspberry Pi to
the dedicated cloud server was of 47ms, and the latency of < 1ms was measured between
the client and the Raspberry Pi.
5.2 Benchmarks and Analysis
For the following benchmarks, we start with the observation of the baseline capabilities
of our testing cloud-based infrastructure for hosting the Hyperledger Fabric. We then
evaluate the base platform and our incrementation of functionality over it, i.e. our pro-
totype blockchain platform. Afterwards, we proceed to the evaluation of our developed
smart hub API prototype.
In all benchmarks ahead, we either directly evaluate the developed prototype block-
chain platform or depend on it as a supporting asset of smart hubs. Thus, it is worth to
note that for our blockchain network, we assume a total of l nodes, out of which n are
endorser nodes. Out of these n endorsers, there may be a number of f faulty nodes within
the network. Excluded from l are nodes related to consensus: HLF orderer nodes, BFT-
SMaRt replicas, and Apache Kafka and Zookeper instances. These were generally locked
at 4 orderer nodes, 4 BFT-SMaRt replicas, 4 Kafka instances and 3 Zookeeper nodes. The
presence of BFT-SMaRt replicas and Kafka and Zookeeper nodes was mutually exclusive
to whether BFT was required for consensus. Except for benchmarks where we explicitly
varied the size of ledger block sizes, we set block size to a maximum of 10 transactions.
Block interval is set at 2s to prevent flooding peers with transaction blocks. All our tests
are executed over a single HLF channel. For experimental assessments where threshold
signatures are leveraged, we assume n = 3f +1, f being the maximum tolerable faults, and
set k = f + 1, k being the minimum viable number for threshold signature reconstruction
quorum size. We request an odd number of signatures in order to obtain a majority in
signature verification quorums.
Regarding signature algorithm parametrization, we perform tests on RSA threshold
signature schemes with varying modulus values N = {1024,2048,3072} and on ECDSA
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multi-signature schemes with a modulus size of N = 256, which are harnessed by the
original HLF implementation. Our rationale behind the variation of RSA modulus values
follows on NIST guidelines4. In summary, key lengths of 2048 bits are reasonable for
today’s standards up until 2030; from that moment on 3072 modulus sizes should be
used for RSA schemes. Keys with a length of 1024 bits are considered to be insecure
and should only be used by legacy systems where it is infeasible to upgrade. In terms of
security level, we establish equivalence between the RSA and ECDSA signature schemes
to be roughly at the 2048 to 3072 bits in RSA versus 256 bits in ECDSA.
It is also worth to note that tests against the HLF blockchain platform, either the
original or our prototype, benchmark the full lifecycle of a transaction: i) from when
they are proposed by a client to a set of endorser nodes; ii) to the moment they are
verified against a smart contract, signed (endorsed) and returned to the client; iii) to the
client receiving all needed endorsements and sending the transaction to the HLF ordering
service; iv) to the ordering service establishing consensus via some off-chain consensus
cluster and publishing a transaction block to the network; and finally v) to the moment
peer nodes verify, commit the transaction to the ledger and confirm it to the client. For
tests against smart hubs, this cost is also included in our benchmarks.
5.2.1 Baseline Observation
Before we assess Fabric in a distributed setting, let us first infer the practical maximum
throughput of our testing machine. Table 5.2 summarizes the results of two micro-
benchmarks we executed initially for this purpose. The first baseline measure is a minimal
run of the HLF as a centralized system where there is a single peer for endorsing transac-
tions and a single orderer for publishing transaction blocks. This test was executed with
a payload of 100 asynchronous invocations of write operations over a single chaincode.
The second baseline is a set of measures obtained from benchmarking the HLF ordering
service only, without any peer nodes involved. This benchmark solely assesses the ability
of a BFT HLF ordering service to close transactions (with a size of 1Kb and 4Kb), i.e. to re-
ceive them, establish consensus, put them into a block and start propagating them across
the network. The benchmarking client produced a workload of 10000 signed transactions
with a random payload for each run. It is important to notice that this measure does not
benchmark the full lifecycle of transactions within the HLF and is the only exception to
this rule in our benchmarks.
This assessment is important so that we can understand the difference in through-
put metrics for the HLF, which for its ordering service can reach orders of magnitude of
hundreds or thousands of transactions and for the full lifecycle of transactions may be
far less, especially taking into account we are running Fabric in a single machine and
not in a physically distributed environment. It is also an important observation of the
4See NIST’s guidelines for cryptographic key lengths here: https://www.keylength.com/en/4/
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Baseline measure Replicas (r) Throughput (tps)
Original HLF with 1 orderer and 1 peer node (no
off-chain consensus) - 15
BFT HLF ordering service [6] with 1 orderer node 4 1082 (1Kb) - 871 (4Kb)
BFT HLF ordering service with 1 orderer node 7 623 (1Kb) - 483 (4Kb)
BFT HLF ordering service with 1 orderer node 10 332 (1Kb) - 268 (4Kb)
Table 5.2: Baseline of the Hyperledger Fabric and impact of the BFT ordering service
decay in performance of the BFT ordering service, which uses the BFT-SMaRt implemen-
tation, with an increasing number of consensus replicas r and when transaction payload
increases. We benchmarked the BFT version of the ordering service and not the original
ordering service because a benchmarking client we could use for this purpose was readily
available5. For the official ordering service, as we will see in the tests ahead, we can
extrapolate throughput to be greater.
5.2.2 Base Platform Throughput
In this first benchmark, our intention was measure the average latency and throughput
of the original HLF 1.1 blockchain platform with a varying network size and a varying
number of endorser nodes. This test allowed us to obtain a criteria comparison of expected
performance that can be used for all posterior benchmarks that involved our prototype.
In terms of test conditions, we initialized a single Hyperledger Caliper client and
submitted Fabric to a workload of 100 asynchronous transactions by invoking write oper-
ations over the same chaincode while varying the total number of peer nodes present in
the network to l = 10,20,30,40,50. The number of endorsers was also increased accord-
ingly to n = 5,7,11,13,15. The write operation being invoked was equivalent to a simple
insertion in a key-value store and its payload was randomly generated.
Endorsers (n)
Total nodes(l)











































Figure 5.1: Base blockchain platform latency (left) and throughput (right) assessment
with a varying number of endorsers and total nodes.
5BFT-SMaRt ordering service and client: https://github.com/bft-smart/fabric-orderingservice
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Our obtained results are illustrated in Figure 5.1. From these results we can see a
very high increase in latency per operation and a steep fall of throughput from when
the network is composed of just 10 nodes with 5 endorsers to when the network size
is doubled and 2 more endorser nodes are leveraged. Curiously, this performance hit
seems to have a increasingly lesser impact when we keep expanding the network and the
number of endorsers.
Looking back to our baseline assessment in the previous section, we had a measure
of 15 tps with a single peer and single orderer. The two initial measurements of this
benchmark, output around 8.8 and 4.4 tps. For these three initial conditions, performance
degradation seems to be exponential. Given this loss of throughput was essentially caused
by increasing network topology, the number of endorsers, and that the ordering service
of the HLF may reach orders of magnitude of hundreds or thousands of transactions per
second, this leads to our belief that the root cause for this behaviour may be the HLF’s
gossip algorithm, leveraged by endorsers to converge on ledger state. We suspect the
temporal complexity for exchanging messages with this protocol may reach O(n2). This
hypothesis is corroborated by the author in [63], where similar results are obtained.
Overall, the results we obtained for l ≥ 30 and n ≥ 11 were unexpected as we were
expecting a higher performance hit for networks of these sizes. We identify this assess-
ment to be an open issue, as we were not able to evaluate the root cause behind this
behaviour. We suspect on the gossip between endorser nodes to be the issue behind
the initial decrease of performance, which should continue to exponentially decrease
throughput for the aforementioned network sizes. A dedicated evaluation to address this
issue is suggested to be performed in future work.
We also find that our HLF throughput results may seem low at first (almost reaching
2 tps in some cases), especially when compared with benchmarks such as the ones in
[72]. However, we remind the reader that our setup is a virtualized Docker network on
a single machine, while, for instance, in [72], the authors are evaluating the HLF in a
physically distributed setting in a high-end datacenter with 1 orderer node, an Apache
Kafka and Zookeeper ensemble of unknown size, and 8 peer nodes, of which only 2 are
endorsers, each instance running isolated in its own physical host and without sharing
server resources. Given a powerful enough production infrastructure, the performance
of HLF can theoretically reach over 1000 tps as mentioned in the related work.
5.2.3 Prototype Throughput and Comparison of Signature Schemes
For this benchmark, our objective was to evaluate the throughput of our prototype
blockchain platform with Byzantine fault-tolerance consensus guarantees and distinct
transaction signature schemes: multi-signatures and threshold signatures. Moreover, as
aforementioned, we conducted our tests with varying RSA modulus values for threshold
signatures in order to assess the impact related to increasing key sizes on the overall
throughput of the platform.
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Regarding test conditions, similarly to previous benchmark, this test was performed
using a single Hyperledger Caliper client issuing 100 asynchronous transactions to block-
chain nodes invoking write operations over an extended smart contract which defined
the signature process to use. We launched a pre-emptive set of requests to all nodes
before starting the evaluation. This ensures three things: i) that chaincode containers
start running before the test (the HLF lazy loads chaincode containers; thus, there is a
performance impact on our tests if we let containers boot mid-experimentation); ii) that
blockchain nodes are ready to execute operations and that no invalid state exists; iii) to
allow the ESCC to identify the signature method to be used for the contract in testing,
minimizing time.
Before we analyze the impact of different transaction signature schemes, let us first
highlight the impact of replacing the HLF original ordering service, which is tolerant
to faults in a fail-stop model, with the prototype BFT ordering service from Sousa et al.
[6] in the same network topology conditions and with the same n endorsers for signing
transactions: l = 20,n = 7. Table 5.3 summarizes this aspect.
Ordering service Consensus model Throughput (tps)
Apache Kafka and Zookeeper (4 + 3 instances) Fail-stop 4.4
BFT-SMaRt (4 replicas) BFT 3
Table 5.3: Throughput comparison between the default and BFT ordering service
The performance decrease in throughput seen here from using a consensus mecha-
nism that provides Byzantine fault-tolerance guarantees versus one that only supports
crash faults is somewhat expected. The underlying BFT-SMaRt ordering service imple-
mentation, which runs a BFT SMR consensus algorithm, has to wait for a quorum of
3f + 1 responses for each consensus round. This may result in an increment in overhead
related to providing resilience in the possibility of Byzantine faults, in comparison with
Zookeeper’s algorithm, Zab, which establishes quorums at 2f + 1 correct responses. With
this information in mind let us proceed with the introduction of signature schemes.
Illustrated in Figure 5.2 are the results for this benchmark. The first information
we can withdraw from these results is that the original HLF ECDSA multi-signatures
are relatively inexpensive in throughput and latency when compared to RSA threshold
signature schemes. When subjected to scalability conditions in the number of endorsers,
the impact on threshold signatures and the throughput difference between both schemes
becomes increasingly accentuated. When compared with RSA threshold signatures of
a similar security level – 2048 to 3072 bits – ECDSA multi-signatures of 256 bits out-
perform such schemes by a considerable magnitude. The increase in latency between
different RSA modulus values N can justified by the exponentiation operations to N in
signature verification which weighs in on the protocol. However, bear in mind that the
performance hit of threshold signatures seen here is a trade-off for decentralization, ro-
bustness and smaller transaction payloads, as we will see in further benchmarks. Given
that our implementation is based on the optimistic version of the threshold signature
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Figure 5.2: Prototype blockchain platform latency (left) and throughput (right) assess-
ment with a varying number of endorsers, switching of signature schemes and varying
RSA modulus for threshold signatures.
verification algorithm, the algorithm was able to verify transactions on the first generated
combination of k shares. Most of the performance impact in threshold signatures seen
here is believed to be related to the signature reconstruction process from the obtained
signature shares during the signature verification algorithm, as the algorithm has to com-
pute a polynomial interpolation of the k signature shares [67, 69] to generate a composite
RSA signature before actually verifying it.
The results we obtained from this test were expected, and similar results were de-
scribed by Stathakopoulou et al. [69]. While the authors obtained a higher throughput
from signature generation and verification processes, their test-bench environment seems
to hint that their experimental evaluation was conducted directly over the signature recon-
struction and verification algorithms themselves as micro-benchmarks, in order to assess
the feasibility of integrating them into HLF, rather than on a complete HLF deployment.
5.2.4 Impact of Transaction Block Sizes
In this benchmark we intended to evaluate the performance of our prototype blockchain
platform with varying transaction block sizes. The size of transaction blocks in a blockchain
system is an extensively discussed topic in the literature [20], especially for public block-
chains such as Bitcoin, and is part of the blockchain scalability problem. Our interest
in this topic is heightened by one of the advantages of threshold signatures over stan-
dard multi-signatures – signature size, a property that can influence the number of total
transactions to be pushed into a single block.
So far, all tests have been done with block sizes of a maximum of 10 transactions.
Block sizes in HLF are configured by three parameters: i) the number of maximum
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transactions to enqueue into the block; ii) the maximum size of the block in Mb, which
takes precedence over the former criteria; and iii) the preferred block size in Kb, which
will be respected by the HLF when possible. Taking into account that we are sending
transactions with very small applicational payloads, the block will reach the maximum
number of transactions while retaining a size inferior or equal to the preferred block size.
The majority of payload size in our tests are essentially the signatures appended to each
transaction. We submitted the prototype blockchain platform in similar conditions to
previous tests but for this benchmark we evaluated only ECDSA multi-signatures and RSA
threshold signatures under comparable security levels (256 bits to 2048, respectively).










































Figure 5.3: Prototype blockchain platform latency (top) and throughput (bottom) assess-
ment with varying transaction block sizes.
Figure 5.3 illustrates our benchmark results in both latency and throughput. Let us
focus on the throughput graph as more significant differences seem to exist between the
curves of the two signature schemes. First of all, we notice that ECDSA multi-signatures
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find their optimal throughput when block sizes are considerably large and near a maxi-
mum of 50 transactions, while for RSA threshold signatures, their optimal performance
seems to be somewhere between the smaller 10 and 20 maximum transactions block sizes.
This evidence is especially interesting for the context of using threshold signature ver-
sus multi-signature schemes. While a single ECDSA 256 signature is smaller in length
than an RSA 2048 signature produced over the same message, the use of ECDSA multi-
signatures results in a payload larger than a single threshold signature. In binary format,
a single ECDSA 256 signature is 64 bytes in length, while for an RSA 2048 signature, the
expected size is 256 bytes. A single transaction endorsed by a multi-signature ECDSA
scheme, s being the ECDSA signature size, would have a maximum signature payload
of n × s. So, in this case 7 × 64 = 448 bytes when compared to the 256 bytes of an RSA
threshold signature. The final size of the signature payload heavily influences the or-
dering service into deciding whether transactions all fit into a single block and can be
readily dispatched or whether some transactions have to wait for the next block in order
to be published due to block size restrictions. This influences the overall throughput of
the HLF. Another observation we can make is that the slope in throughput in ECDSA
multi-signatures from blocks with 50 transactions to blocks with 100 seems to be very ac-
centuated in comparison with RSA threshold signatures. This leads us to think that there
is a point in which the block size may grow to a number so elevated that the throughput
of threshold signatures surpasses multi-signatures.
The results we see here were expected. One of the advantages of threshold signa-
tures schemes is their fixed bounded size, while for multi-signatures the total size of the
signature set varies with the number of signers. This is an important key factor of our
dissertation, and shows that block sizes can be optimized for higher throughput while
maintaining group-oriented decentralized trustability assumptions.
5.2.5 Fault-tolerance in Transaction Signature Schemes
The present benchmark assesses the fault-tolerance of different signature schemes har-
nessed by our prototype blockchain platform. In regular situations, a signature scheme
that requires multi-signatures from a strict set of entities where a single party fails to
sign a given message fails to verify. However, while Fabric implements a strict notion
of which entities should sign a given transaction for a given contract, it also allows the
configuration of what is called an endorsement policy, a user-defined logical expression
that specifies the conditions in which a multi-signature set may be accepted or refused
(e.g. party A may fail to sign message M as long as party B signs it instead). While this
mechanism is an important component of HLF that leaves fault-tolerance conditions in
signature verification up to organizations, we are more interested in the ability of using a
signature scheme that may be able to represent the entities of a given endorsement policy
as a group even if an individual did not sign it due to some kind of fault, hence threshold
signatures.
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So far, we have been using a dummy endorsement policy for Fabric accepting endorse-
ments from any peer node and where the absence of peer signatures is allowed as long
as at least one endorsement is produced, independently of the peer’s organization. For
this test, we stray away from this lax policy and define a policy that requires all n nodes
to sign transaction proposals. For multi-signature schemes, this means that a peer fails
to sign the transaction, the transaction itself fails to execute. We set the number of en-
dorsers n = 7 and network size l = 10, and injected a payload of 100 transactions using
Hyperledger Caliper, as in previous benchmarks. The reason why we set l = 10 in com-
parison with previous benchmarks is that a more significant output can be read in terms
of throughput (e.g. in l = 20, we could have situations in which throughput would reach
about zero transactions per second and it would be difficult for us to observe a tendency).
Transaction block size was reset to a maximum of 10 transactions. As mentioned in the
beginning of this section, the minimum quorum size for our threshold signature scheme
is set at k = f + 1 where n = 3f + 1 are the number of endorsers needed to tolerate f
faults. We execute this test in the presence of both crash and Byzantine faults by force-
fully killing the container processes of peer nodes or by using tampered versions of the
peer nodes image to output corrupted signatures, respectively. We increase the number












































ECDSA256 Multi-sig. with any type of faults
RSA2048 Threshold sig. with crash faults
RSA2048 Threshold sig. with Byzantine faults
Figure 5.4: Prototype blockchain platform latency (left) and throughput (right) assess-
ment in the presence of crash and Byzantine faults in endorser nodes with different
signature schemes.
Figure 5.4 illustrates our results. First of all, notice that we were only able to eval-
uate ECDSA multi-signatures in conditions where no faults occur. After a single faulty
endorsers, the endorsement policy triggered a failure in client and committer validations.
Thus, no measurement was able to be made in f = 1,2,3. For threshold signatures, there
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is an almost negligible throughput gain when crash faults start occurring. We believe
this simply to be the fact that the client has to wait for less signatures before sending a
transaction to the orderer nodes. Remember that all communication between the client
and peer nodes is protected by gRPCS, so when a peer crashes, Caliper acknowledges the
failure in a short span of time (since the TLS server-side socket closed) and no longer waits
for responses from it. After a transaction block is published, less signature shares are
combined for threshold signature verification by the committing peers, and confirming
the transaction to the client should therefore be faster. For Byzantine failure conditions,
an interesting spike in latency and loss of throughput is visible for threshold signatures.
This occurs due to the optimistic signature verification algorithm we have implemented.
When no faults occur, the algorithm is able to verify a threshold signature on the first
attempt to reconstruct it from a single combination of k signature shares. By inducing
faults, we can observe that the algorithm was unable to do so at a first try, and had to
recompute a new combination for k out of the n received shares, reconstruct the com-
posite signature and re-verify it. Each successive fault added the need to execute further
combinations.
These results were expected and show the capability of threshold signatures to endure
Byzantine participants or crashes in signature verification processes to a given threshold.
We did not increase f further than 3 as this would naturally result in a failure to meet
the threshold k. One thing to note is that our results in throughput seem to show linear
decay of performance. However, our benchmark assesses a very small population of faulty
nodes and a small number of endorsers. We believe this curve may reach exponential
values when there is a very large number f of Byzantine parties, as stated in [69], since at








to either find out no combination of k will result in a valid signature
or that the last combination is the only valid one.
5.2.6 Smart Hub Scalability and Throughput
For this benchmark and the following, we deviate our focus of the prototype blockchain
platform to the outermost layer of our system and look to the edge environment. Specifi-
cally for this benchmark, the target of our evaluation was our prototype smart hub API.
Here, we evaluate the smart hub API from an HTTP/CoAP client in an truly E2E (end-to-
end) scenario, as we used our prototype blockchain platform as supporting asset to the
smart hub. Thus, latency values presented here are influenced by the blockchain platform
conditions we assessed in previous benchmarks.
For this test we used our HTTP/CoAP client implementation, which is capable of
launching multiple client threads simultaneously, each producing a workload of 10 op-
erations (60% read operations and 40% write operations). For simplicity, we assess this
benchmark in latency per operation requested to the hub only. We varied the number
of clients c to c = 1,10,25,75 to assess the capability of our smart hub implementation
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to scale in an emulated yet ever increasing environment of IoT devices and users. We
ran the smart hub in its emulated version, i.e. executing it locally from our test laptop.
The smart hub CoAP and HTTP thread pools for attending requests were both limited
to 12 threads. Regarding the signature schemes of the supporting blockchain platform,
we set it to use only ECDSA multi-signatures of 256 bits and RSA threshold signatures of
2048 bits. HTTP communication channels between the client and the hub were protected
with TLS 1.2, while for CoAP no security protocol was leveraged for in transit traffic6. It
is worth to mention that the CoAP protocol could be implemented using TCP and even
configured to use TLS, but our version communicates solely through UDP.




















CoAP and RSA2048 Threshold sig.
HTTP and RSA2048 Threshold sig.
CoAP and ECDSA256 Multi-sig.
HTTP and ECDSA256 Multi-sig.
Figure 5.5: Prototype smart hub scalability assessment with CoAP and HTTP communi-
cation protocols and different supporting blockchain transactions signature schemes.
Figure 5.5 illustrates our benchmark results. First, let us notice that when using
the ECDSA multi-signature scheme, the observed latency is lower than when using RSA
threshold signatures, a tendency we had already identified in previous assessments. The
second observation we can make is that under small to medium concurrent client con-
ditions (1 ≤ c ≤ 25) our implementation scales reasonably well. We foresee that our
implementation would be adequate for small IoT enviroments that do not require imme-
diate real-time response rates, such as a smart home or a smart bicycle rack where it is
also unlikely to have an extreme amount of IoT devices connected to a single hub. Again,
bear in mind that the supporting blockchain platform is not running on what we would
call a production environment; it is running on single virtualized machine and much
lower latency values could possibly be obtained from the smart hub if a more powerful
supporting blockchain infrastructure was available. When c = 75, the latency per opera-
tion increases considerably, as the smart hub has to enqueue multiple requests in parallel
while waiting on previous transactions to the blockchain to complete. As there are limits
6As of the writing of this document, the mbed CoAP library did not support DTLS, although we did
implement DTLS in an alternative version of the smart hub.
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on the CoAP and HTTP server-side thread pools attending requests, as not to consume
too much resources on the host machine, there is a bottleneck at the smart hub commu-
nication entry point. The third and final observation is the difference in latency between
the CoAP and HTTP protocols. CoAP communication seems to be able to achieve lower
latency values by marginal differences.
While a higher difference in latency between the CoAP and the HTTP protocols could
be expected, taking into account that we use TLS for HTTP and that CoAP is UDP
datagram-oriented (and thus, there should be a speed advantage of UDP over TCP as
the sender does not have to establish a TCP connection and wait for an acknowledge
packet before sending the actual message), we must take into account that CoAP requires
an acknowledge packet for every datagram it sends, while TCP, after its slow-start phase,
is able to acknowledge multiple packets with a single ACK message [51]. The CoAP spec-
ification [66] explicitly states that the protocol provides reliability in messages marked
as confirmable through acknowledge, reset and non-confirmable return messages. How-
ever, the biggest benefit of CoAP is related to resource consumption, especially for client
devices, rather than speed. This is something that will be evident in the next section.
However, before we proceed to the next section, let us first evaluate the performance
of the smart hub API on a physical device with less resources than our local laptop: a
Raspberry Pi, an equipment which would feasibly be seen in an IoT environment and
that could possibly assume the role of a lightweight smart hub deployment. For this test
we benchmarked the physical smart hub against the emulated one on similar conditions.
The number of clients was set to c = 10 and the same workload and testing conditions
aforementioned were replicated except for signature schemes, which we restricted to RSA






















Figure 5.6: Performance comparison between an emulated version of the smart hub
prototype and a physical version deployed on the Raspberry Pi.
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The results of this test are shown in Figure 5.6. Latency per operation on the physical
smart hub was quite higher than our laptop, which was expected given the specifications
of our laptop versus the specifications of a Raspberry Pi. In terms of CoAP versus HTTP
performance, CoAP was again marginally better in latency. This test lets us partially
assess our host machine requirements for the smart hub API having the Raspberry Pi as
a minimum baseline. For small IoT environments where waiting a considerable amount
of seconds for an operation to execute, a Raspberry Pi would be an acceptable host. We
foresee more complex smart hubs to be somewhere in between our emulated deployment
and the physical one.
5.2.7 Smart Hub and Client Resource Consumption
For this benchmark, our intention was to assess the consumption of hardware resources
at the edge when IoT devices and other client applications exchange data with the smart
hub. Our metrics are in allocated memory (in Mb) and CPU usage (%) by the respective
applications.
To conduct this test, we set the supporting prototype blockchain platform to only use
RSA threshold signatures with 2048 bits. We then subjected the smart hub to a varying
number of concurrent clients, each producing a workload of 10 operations (60% read
operations and 40% write operations), similarly to the conditions of the previous bench-
mark, and ran the smart hub in its emulated form. During the test we simultaneously
monitored both the smart hub and the client issuing HTTP/CoAP requests and analyzed
their runtime heap dumps using the tools described in the beginning of this chapter.
Heap using CoAP
Non-heap using CoAP




















b) Heap using HTTP
Non-heap using HTTP
Figure 5.7: Peak memory consumption of the smart hub prototype with CoAP and HTTP
communication protocols.
Figure 5.7 shows our results in terms of peak allocated memory on the smart hub. We
divide results in heap memory and non-heap memory (stack, data and code segments,
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etc.) and show the peak memory usage before JAVA garbage collection occurred. Non-
heap memory is relevant for us to understand the memory footprint of the execution of
the smart hub threads. Heap memory, on the other hand, is what truly allows us to assess
the dynamic allocation of data that may result from requesting operations to the hub. In
our results, we again compare both protocols: CoAP and HTTP. However, it is critical to
note that the memory results seen here correspond to the whole smart hub application as
a unit. Thus, while difference in memory footprints for CoAP and HTTP may be visible,
a big percentage of memory is consumed by the smart hub to execute other inherent
functions, such as orchestrating communication with blockchain broker nodes, storing
smart contract cache, maintaining a database connection, and so on. Looking at our result
set, we can see some small differences in memory consumption. In general, we can see that
CoAP and HTTP increase their overall memory footprint significantly when the number
of c clients increase to a concurrency scenario. However, in comparison with one another,
their non-heap memory consumption was nearly identical. The big difference between
both lies in the consumption of heap memory, where we can see a discernible contrast.
When c = 10 we can see that the gap in heap memory reaches the order of magnitudes
of nearly 50Mb between CoAP and HTTP. Afterwards, when c = 75, the heap footprint
between both protocols seems to converge. Overall, the average consumption of the smart
hub when using both protocols is around m1 ≈ 311Mb for CoAP and m2 ≈ 341Mb for
HTTP. Difference in heap memory consumption between both is ∆m = 30Mb ≈ 9%. Bear
this value in mind, as we proceed to evaluate the CPU usage of the smart hub and the
resource footprint of the client application.




















Figure 5.8: Peak CPU usage of the smart hub prototype with CoAP and HTTP communi-
cation protocols.
Figure 5.8 shows the peak CPU usage of the smart hub during our assessment. For
a single client (c = 1), the smart hub consumes more CPU amid CoAP communication
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that in does for HTTP. Then, when the number of concurrent clients reaches values of
c = 10,25,75, we can then observe that HTTP CPU usage surpasses CoAP. In average,
CoAP reaches a CPU usage percentage on the smart hub of c1 = 21% and HTTP reaches
around c2 = 25%, with a mere difference of ∆c = 4% between both. Let us now assess the





































Figure 5.9: Peak memory consumption (left) and CPU usage (right) evaluation of the
benchmarking client implementation using CoAP and HTTP communication protocols.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the results for CoAP and HTTP communication of monitoring
our client implementation in the previous benchmark when a single thread is in execution.
This benchmark is especially important as it assesses the impact of communication with
our prototype for what could be an resource-constricted IoT device. Looking at our results,
we can observe that, as in previous benchmarks and as expected, non-heap memory is
roughly the same between HTTP and CoAP. However, we see a completely different order
of magnitude related to the consumption of heap memory between both protocols, from
just m1 = 5Mb in CoAP to m2 = 42Mb in HTTP. Remember that in the smart hub we were
looking at an 9% decrease, while here we are reaching around 88%. In an IoT device
where memory hardware is optimized to the minimum as viably possible in relation with
the cost of production of the device, a small memory footprint is essential. This is exactly
what our test shows: CoAP is much more capable of saving memory for client applications
than HTTP is.
The contrast in memory consumption for both the smart hub and the client is ex-
pected. When comparing CoAP and HTTP, CoAP sends messages in what it defines as
a compressed format [66]. A UDP packet has a minimum header of 8 bytes and a CoAP
header is merely 4 bytes long. In comparison, a HTTP header completely overshadows
CoAP, as a TCP header alone has a limit of 20 bytes while HTTP can be quite complex and
thus has no limit over the header size [51]. Curiously, the CPU load for the client when
issuing CoAP requests is higher than when using HTTP (the same situation occurs on the
smart hub when a single client communicates with the hub). This can be a drawback for
IoT devices which are limited in battery resources. A higher CPU load can lead to a faster
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consumption of battery and reduce the reliability of the device. While we did not explore
the root cause for this increase, we suspect it may be an implementation characteristic of
the mbed CoAP library due to a possible lack of resource optimization.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter we described our experimental assessment results over our implemented
prototype. We conducted an experimental evaluation on both the blockchain platform
component of the prototype as well as the smart hub API in an attempt to obtain the a
set of criteria that could answer the questions mentioned in the beginning of this chap-
ter. A rigorous analysis was executed for each benchmark section, which are succinctly
summarized below:
• The baseline expected performance of running the Hyperledger Fabric on a single
cloud server in a virtualized Docker environment;
• The baseline expected performance of the BFT consensus ordering service in the
same conditions and its elasticity when the number of replicas increases;
• The average latency and throughput of the original blockchain platform with an
increasing network topology and a higher number of transaction endorsing nodes;
• The average latency and throughput of our prototype blockchain platform with a
varying number of endorsers and with the usage of different transaction signature
verification schemes: ECDSA multi-signatures and RSA threshold signatures (with
different RSA modulus values);
• The impact and possible performance optimizations that can be performed with
changing ledger block sizes to fit more or less transactions into a single block, taking
into account the aforementioned signature schemes;
• The capability for withstanding Byzantine and crash faults in endorsing processes
for both signature schemes;
• The scalability and throughput of our smart hub implementation in the presence
of an ever increasing number of clients that can be seen as an approximation to IoT
things in a real IoT environment, alongside a technical assessment of the possible
advantages of harnessing the CoAP protocol over HTTP for such devices;
• The resource consumption, in terms of memory and CPU usage, for both smart hub
and benchmarking client implementations when using CoAP or HTTP;
Answering our own questions, our conclusion is the following. Overall, given our
results, we believe that on a physically distributed cloud infrastructure (preferably het-
erogeneous in cloud providers), our prototype blockchain platform can be deployed to
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achieve high throughput with low latency values, even when using RSA threshold sig-
nature schemes. As seen in our assessments, our scheme outperforms multi-signature
schemes in conditions where there is a strict endorsement policy for transactions and
some of endorsing entities may be faulty, thus providing a truly decentralized approach
for transaction endorsement and verification. Additionally, we were able to achieve opti-
mal throughput for threshold signatures in smaller block sizes when compared to multi-
signatures, an evidence that proves our system is capable of producing signature payloads
with much smaller lengths. As RSA threshold signatures of 3072 bits cause some over-
head on the system, our recommendation to keep the prototype on pair with current
security practices is to use keys of 2048 bits.
At the edge, we were able to provide an implementation that scales relatively well for
small to medium IoT environments. In large IoT environments where large numbers of
IoT devices communicate simultaneously, our proposition would be to leverage further
hubs to hierarchically aggregate communication. We were also able to leverage a protocol
whose memory footprint is more adequate for the IoT device range when compared to
popular network protocols such as HTTP. Regarding CPU usage, we obtained some results
that were unexpected but we assume this may be due to some lack of optimization in the
library we leveraged.
As a final remark, we believe that our blockchain-supported prototype is a valid proof-
of-work for a scalable and more decentralized cloud-enabled blockchain IoT architecture,











Conclusion and Final Remarks
In this chapter we conclude the present document with some conclusions regarding the
research that was conducted, our system model and its prototype implementation, what
was done and some of the limitations that exist. We will also present some suggestions
that would allow someone to potentially address these limitations in the future.
6.1 Conclusions
The research conducted during this thesis allowed us to grasp the current neglected state
of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), security and privacy-wise, and explore on the cloud-first
architectures on which this paradigm currently sits upon. We studied on the inner work-
ings of blockchain technology and existing blockchain platforms, whose properties seem
to meet with the IoT’s needs regarding robustness, auditability and security. To under-
stand the limitations and advantages of existing blockchain platforms, an analysis on
software engineering, system architecture and programming support was done for a rep-
resentative group of platforms, which we provide as a contribution to consolidating the
current state-of-the-art of blockchain technology. We also reviewed existing decentral-
ized ledgering solutions for the IoT and scrutinize the use of threshold cryptography for
blockchain systems as an approach for integrating group-oriented trustability assump-
tions into blockchain architecture.
The system model we propose for IoT environments presents itself as a tiered blockchain-
based Byzantine fault-tolerant model ensuring decentralization of trust and non-repudiation
capabilities while enabling independent auditability of data for every involved party, that
can be heterogeneously deployed across cloud providers to achieve scalability and prevent
vendor lock-in. Our intention with this model is to improve on current IoT architectures
as a first step to taking back control from service providers and making sure every party
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is protected from fraudulent behaviours, while abstracting the weight of the blockchain
protocol from IoT devices, of which most are heavily resource-constrained.
Based on our model, we built a fully functional end-to-end prototype, and thus im-
plemented and extended a system on top of a known blockchain platform we evaluated
thoroughly in our related work – the Hyperledger Fabric – adding the services imposed
by our system model. Smart hub and client implementations were also built and used to
mediate communication with the blockchain back-end and to issue new transactions and
queries to the hub, respectively. Our implementation was done having into account the re-
source restrictions of most IoT devices, harnessing both CoAP and HTTP communication
protocols.
The executed experimental evaluation allowed us to assess how our prototype per-
formed in terms of throughput and latency with a BFT consensus mechanism, varying
signature schemes (multi-signatures and threshold signatures), algorithms and key sizes,
in the presence of crash faults and Byzantine behaviour, with a varying size for transac-
tion blocks, and with an increased number of clients and traffic pressure on smart hubs,
as to infer its scalability. From the results we conclude that our prototype is valid proof-
of-work for a scalable and more decentralized cloud-enabled blockchain IoT architecture
that is capable to address the drawbacks of today’s cloud-first IoT architectures.
Overall, we addressed the problems proposed to us in this thesis and devised a model
and proof-of-work of that same model, capable of providing itself as an alternative to
traditional IoT architectures, in which the nature of the service is still cloud-centric while
allowing independent scrutiny by end users and better control of their own data, devices
and transactions, with the added resiliency properties of a blockchain together with
decentralized and robust signature verification processes, thereby preventing tampering
and corruption of data by a malicious party.
6.2 Future Work
We were able to develop a functional prototype of our system model, although there are
still some issues that could be improved upon in the future.
Regarding our blockchain services implementation, our solution for leveraging thresh-
old signatures for transaction signing and verification may present a few performance
drawbacks related to having to delegate signature construction and verification from
blockchain nodes main execution process to an external dedicated component. Albeit
its modularity, this implementation requires the integration of server-side code for es-
tablishing connections, accepting requests and maintaining thread pools for attending
tasks. As stated earlier, this was mostly due to lack of cryptographic primitives for sup-
porting threshold signatures in Golang, the language in which Hyperledger Fabric is
implemented. A direction for future work would be further investigation of a solution
implementing threshold signatures directly in Golang and remeasuring the performance
of using RSA threshold signature schemes with various key sizes versus standard ECDSA
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multi-signatures, in order to assess if considerable performance gain is achievable in
return for the modularity of this component.
Again in our implementation of threshold signing and verification processes, we inject
key material directly into blockchain peers. Our solution, however, is compatible with
the notion of a trusted dealer. A direction for future work could be implementing such a
notion in a way that does not bring about centralization of the generation key material to
a single entity, since this presents a single point of failure (e.g. the private keys could be
exposed, corrupted keys could be distributed, etc.). A solution could be to either make
use of a consortium consensus service to generate cryptographic material and thus act as
a trusted dealer. Another direction could be studying and implementing the generation
of threshold signature keys in an interactive algorithm between participating blockchain
peers rather than depending on a trusted dealer.
Related to our smart hub component, other relevant research directions are the sup-
port of other interoperability protocols that are designed for implementation in IoT de-
vices. This effort must be seen as a natural evolution and extension of smart hub modules,
in convergence with the broader view expressed in the discussion of the functionality of
smart hubs for IoT edge-based environments. A possible initial approach for this could
consist in leveraging the MQTT protocol for the smart hub API in order to communicate
with resource-limited IoT devices, alongside CoAP. While both are recognized open stan-
dards for IoT communication, MQTT is more oriented to publish-subscribe architectures
with many-to-many communication flows in which there can be a single broker publish-
ing information to a set of subscribers, while CoAP works in a traditional client-server
one-to-one communication flow. While CoAP may be sufficient for simpler IoT environ-
ment scenarios, we find that MQTT may better adapt to the nature of smart hubs that
require sharing data between several aggregated devices.
There is a space to research on better expressiveness conditions of smart contracts to
support IoT operations enabled by blockchain transactions and expressed smart contracts.
Smart contracts can be used to define parameters, rules and invariants for different levels
of execution requirements. These requirements range from specific IoT application-level
validation guarantees, to parameters and conditions dynamically regulating the inter-
nal services of blockchain service planes (including storage, aggregation of transactions,
management of stored blocks, ordering semantics, or endorsement criteria), in a more
re-configurable or possibly dynamic re-configurable runtime environment. In terms of
smart contract verification and persistency at the Contract Interpreter component of our
prototype, improvements can be made as future work so that the smart hub may be able
to update locally cached contracts upon new versions being deployed to the blockchain.
Storing some sort of meta-data and version numbers for each contract, alongside a mech-
anism to ensure consistency between the blockchain services and the smart hub could be
a direction for addressing this improvement.
Going back on our system model, our extended interaction model was not addressed
in our prototype. Due to time restrictions, we only implemented the base interaction
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model. A direction for future work would be following on the extended interaction
model to implement a similar set of services to those installed on the smart hub imple-
mentation in user devices capable of enough computation and with enough resources
(e.g. smartphones) to communicate directly with blockchain broker nodes. A suggestion
to address this as future work could be in extending our work for the developed Android
application so that it does not rely solely on a smart hub.
Our testing environment also had some limitations in terms of computation and re-
source capabilities that prevented us from running tests with blockchain networks having
a high number of nodes. As stated earlier, we ran a virtualized Docker network over a
single server. However, we were unable to produce high levels of throughput without
resource limitations of the machine severely impacting our tests. Thus, we were unable
to explore the total throughput potential of the Hyperledger Fabric and of our prototype.
Thus, we believe that the approach for properly testing a highly dense blockchain net-
work, and something that could be assessed in future work, would be to run our solution
in a physically distributed environment.
In some specific benchmarks, such as measuring the throughput of the original Hyper-
ledger Fabric platform and in measuring the resource consumption of the CoAP protocol
versus HTTP, we obtained some peculiar results. For the former, we believe that Fabric’s
performance decays exponentially due to the gossip protocol, which we suspect to have a
O(n2) temporal complexity in the number of peers of the blockchain network. However,
we believe further testing has to be executed in future work to confirm this hypothesis,
as our results seem to show a stabilizing tendency in throughput when network density
increases. For the latter, while we obtained expected results in terms of memory consump-
tion between both protocols, we also observed that CPU load of CoAP was higher than
HTTP for client implementations, something which we assume to be a lack of resource
optimization in the CoAP library we use for our prototype. Further analysis can be done
in future work to identify the root cause of this issue.
Another issue that was not dealt with in this thesis, is the future comparison of the
obtained results with the officially supported BFT algorithm that will be launched for the
HLF consensus plane in the near future, using more extensive benchmarks.
Finally, there is another research direction in other aspects with relevant impact for
scalability purposes. We summarize some of these research directions in two different
groups of concerns: scale-in and scale-out concerns. For scale-in concerns we must
observe the on-going research proposals in addressing better performance figures for
HLF (and other permissioned blockchains in the ongoing research agenda), as well in
the approach of separation concerns decoupling membership services, consensus planes
for consistency control and decentralized hierarchies of blockchains, for example in a
tree-based architectural model or by using sharding models interconnecting different
blockchain domains. For scale-out purposes, we can extend the current system model in
the dissertation by interconnecting smart hubs in edged-based blockchains, or possibly
composed by other smart hubs in upper-level hierarchies.
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